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INTRODUCTION

On January 1, 1994, coinciding with the entering into force of
NAFTA,' an armed rebellion erupted in Mexico's southern state of
Chiapas. 2 Thousands of impoverished and uneducated Mayan Indians,
principally composed of members of the Tzotzil, Tzeltal and Tojobal
indigenous peoples, rose in arms to demand an immediate response from the
government of Mexico to their chronic and unanswered problems.
As the New Year dawned, Indians came out of the forests, down from the

hills, and took over nine towns in Chiapas. They invaded town halls and
burned the archives of their oppression. They destroyed the land deeds, the
titles establishing ownership of what once had been theirs. They seized a

hated former governor of the state. In the tourist-crammed mountain town

of San Cristobal they made their way to the local paper-El Tiempo-that
had always been friendly to indigenous people, and proclaimed their rising
in the name of the Zapatista Liberation Army.
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296
and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. According to Article 2203 of NAFTA, this
trilateral treaty entered into force on January 1, 1994. Id. at 702.
2. For information on Chiapas, see infra notes 45-60 and accompanying texts.
3. Alexander Cockburn & Kieran Murray, A Fisiful of Promises. Agreement Between Mexico
and Zapatista Rebels, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Mar. 18, 1994, at 21.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994

1

2

California Western
International
Law Journal,
Vol.JOURNAL
25, No. 1 [1994],
Art. 225
[Vol.
LAW
INTERNATIONAL
WESTERN
CALIFORNIA

The Indians demanded improvement of their living conditions, better
education for their children in rural and Indian communities, access to
medical care, secure land ownership, respect for their unique ethnicity, fair
political elections and the establishment of a truly democratic system in the
country." In a manifesto put out by the rebels these demands were summarized in the following ten points: (1) work, (2) land, (3) shelter, (4) nutrition,
(5) health, (6) education, (7) liberty, (8) democracy, (9) justice, and (10)
peace.
The Chiapas rebellion represents Mexico's most serious armed
insurgency movement in the last two decades,' since the Mexican Army
violently crushed the guerrilla uprising of Lucio Cabafias in the State of
Guerrero in the 1970s.
The explosion of the Chiapas rebellion took Mexico, and the world, by
surprise. When the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was
preparing to initiate the official euphoria triggered by the legal arrival of
NAFTA, the Indian rebellion in Chiapas instantly darkened the social and
legal perspectives within that country, especially obscuring its political and
economic image abroad. "Everything changed overnight. In 1994 we woke
up in a new country, a country where we have to live in a different way, in
confusion, sadness, anxiety, desperation, bursts of machine-gun fire; la
guerrilla."'
The rebels named their movement "Ej~rcito Zapatista de Liberaci6n
Nacional"9 (i.e., Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN).' ° This
name was given in honor of the memory of the revolutionary hero from
Morelos, Emiliano Zapata, 1 whose political philosophy, encapsulated in the
motto "Tierra y Libertad" (Land and Freedom), nurtured the content of
Article 27 of Mexico's 1917 Constitution.12 This philosophy led Mexico's

4. For a more specific list of demands, see app. 2.
5. Cockburn & Murray, supra note 3, at 20.
6. Patrick McDonnell, The Roots of the Rebellion, L.A. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Mar. 6,
1994, at 33.
7. Id.
8. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 32 (quoting Elena Poniatowska, La Jornada).
9. The most basic aspects of the Eircito 7apatistade Liberaci6n Nacional (EZLN), such as
its formation, structure, training, leadership, armament and financing, remain a mystery. See
supra note 3.
10. Michael S. Serrill, Zapata'sRevenge, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 33.
11. Recently, Emiliano Zapata has been recognized among the truly remarkable figures in
Mexico's history. Born in 1873 in San Miguel Anenecuilco, Morelos, Zapata became involved
in the 1910 Revolution as an advocate in favor of agrarian reform, which fundamental principles
he enumerated in his famous Plan de Ayala (For the content of this Plan, see infra notes 251-54
and accompanying texts). He was assassinated in Chinameca, Morelos, in 1919. For an excellent
biography, see JOHN WOMACK, ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1970).
12. The tragic conditions of indigenous peoples in Mexico, comparable to servitude
conditions, led to Mexico's armed revolution in 1910. The Constitution of 1917 was a product
of this movement. Article 27 of this Constitution enshrines Mexico's legal philosophy regarding
its natural resources and property questions, including land and water rights affecting indigenous
peoples in rural communities. See MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CONQUEST
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official party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, better known by its
acronym "PRI," to establish agrarian reform and its program for the distribution of land among campesinos,13 including indigenous peoples. Unfortunately, most of the demands advanced by Zapata early this century,
especially those affecting indigenous peoples, remained unanswered.
For ten days, the Mexican Army launched a heavy military attack against
the rebels. The Mexican military, apparently surprised by the unexpected
rebellion, was forced to "abandon its traditional low profile and wage war
through the jungles of southern Mexico; a job military experts say it was illprepared, underfunded and poorly equipped to take on."' 4
According to U.S. media reports, the Mexican Army utilized armored
personnel carriers and U.S.-made Humvees which were diverted to Chiapas
from other parts of Mexico. 5 However, the bulk of its fire power, consisting of "soldiers armed with German-designed G-3 automatic rifles. U.S.made light helicopter gunships, believed to number fewer than two dozen,
and three propeller driven planes armed with rockets,"16 provided air cover
for the infantry. Mexican soldiers
mounted a bloody offensive against the retreating rebels, sweeping through
villages and arresting scores of peasants, most of whom protested their
innocence. Helicopter gunships launched rockets and sprayed machine-gun
Official estimates put the death toll at about
fire on rural enclaves ....
100, though many believe it to be much higher-the evidence is concealed
in common graves throughout the region. The Mexican Army, it appeared,
tactics so popular among nearby Central
was emulating the scorched-earth
7
American regimes.
The Mexican weekly Proceso, which has been reporting in detail the
peasant uprising in Chiapas, provided:
A month after the armed conflict in Chiapas was initiated, the complaints
against the Mexican Army for human rights violations include bombing of
inhabited towns; illegal and arbitrary detentions; unconstitutional searches
of homes; abuses of authority; intimidation and threats to individuals and
groups; torture; forced and involuntary disappearances [of persons];

CONTINUED: DISREGARD FOR HUMAN INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE MEXICAN STATE OF CHIAPAS

5 (1992) [hereinafter CONQUEST CONTINUED]
13. A campesino is a peasant, THE CONCISE AMERICAN HERITAGE SPANISH DICTIONARY

48 (1989).
14. Tod Robberson, Mexican Army Short of Funds and Combat Experience, WASH. POST, Jan.
19, 1994, at A-21.
15. Id.
16. The Washington Post reported that a U.S. official quoted by the Reuter news service said
"the helicopters were sold to Mexico for drug interdiction and that after review of U.S.
restrictions on the sale, Mexican officials assured Washington that the craft had been returned
to antinarcotics duty." Id. (emphasis added). This report suggests that Mexico used the
helicopters in violation of the terms of the agreement entered into with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Id.
17. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 32.
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Probably as a reaction to mounting international pressure, President
Salinas de Gortari reversed his militaristic policy on January 5, 1994. He
offered the rebels a cease-fire and amnesty, calling for "an immediate end to
hostilities, surrender of all weaponry, freedom for all persons kidnapped or
taken prisoner and identification of all guerilla leaders and interlocutors." 9
He also appointed Manuel Camacho Solis to the position of Commissioner
for Peace and Reconciliation.' ° Mr. Camacho and the rebels, represented
by Subcomandante Marcos, 2 ' reached a tentative settlement on March 2,
1994,1 utilizing the mediation services of the Catholic Bishop of San
Crist6bal de las Casas, Samuel Ruiz.'
On March 2, 1994, the EZLN submitted to the federal government of
Mexico a formal document containing thirty-four specific "Demands and
Engagements to Achieve a Dignified Peace in Chiapas."' From a substantive viewpoint, these demands may be categorized into the following five
general issues: political, legal, socio-economic, military, and women's.
The EZLN's main political demands were that the President of Mexico
and other "State executives" (i.e. governors of states) resign and a "transition government" be formed immediately. 5 In essence, the EZLN implied

18. Guillermo Correa, et al., En Chiapas, despues de las batallas: Narracionesde Como en
Ejrcito ha asesinado, torturado, saqueado .
PROCESO, Feb. 7, 1994, at 6 (translation by
the author).
19. Tod Robberson, Mexico Attacks by Air, Offers Terms to Rebels, WASH. POST (Final ed.),
Jan. 6, 1994, at A-12.
20. Manuel Comacho Solis was a former Mayor of Mexico City whom President Salinas
failed to name as the next PRI presidential candidate. See Tod Robberson, Mexico Declares
Cease-Fire in Chiapas, WASH. POST (Final edition), Jan. 13, 1994, at A-18. In this article,
Robberson reports:
The [Mexican] President has been criticized for dispatching thousands of troops and
heavy weaponry to the [Chiapas] region and allowing military aircraft to rocket
civilian-inhabited areas in attacks against the rebels. . . Salinas had no intention of
fighting a potentially lengthy jungle war. His peace offensive. . . was designed to
escape the kind of military-based reaction that led to civil wars in nearby El
Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala during the 1970s and '80s.
21. Tod Robberson, Mexico's Ski-Masked Rebels Show Flairfor Communicating, WASH. POST
(Final edition), Feb. 9, 1994, at A14; A Cult Hero of Mexico's Revolution, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
14, 1994, at A6.
22. Tod Robberson, Mexican Insurgents Gain Leverage. Accord Allows Rebels to Keep
Weapons Until Government Implements PoliticalReforms, WASH. POST (Final edition), Mar. 6,
1994, at A-25.
23. Andrew A. Reding, Rebellion in Mexico, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at A-19.
24. DIRECCION GENERAL DE INFORMACI6N, SECRETARfA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES,
BOLETIN DE INFORMACION SEMANAL, No. 254, Demandas y Compronsospara una Paz Digna

en Chiapas 48-69 (Mar. 5, 1994) (translation by the author) [hereinafter Demandas y
Compromisos]. This document contains all EZLN's demands and the Mexican government's res
ponses to them.
25. Demands 1 and 2. Id. at 49.
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that the election of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988, and of some
state governors, were not legitimate. Thus, the EZLN demanded the
formation of a transition government to provide "equality and respect for all
political trends. "26
Of the ten legal demands specifically advanced by the EZLN, the most
significant were: (1) to revise the text of NAFTA to incorporate the interests
and needs of the indigenous peoples; (2) to amend Article 27 of Mexico's
Constitution, so lands will be given to indigenous peoples and not to "large
landholders;" (3) to be able to administer their own system of justice
according to their customs and traditions, without the intervention of
illegitimate and corrupt governments; and (4) to repeal the Penal Code of
Chiapas.27
The socio-economic demands included: (1) hospitals with "specialized
doctors;" (2) "houses with electricity, drinking water, roads, sewage,
telephones, transportation;" (3) ending illiteracy; (4) "dignified jobs with a
(5) ending hunger and malnutrition; and (6) "peace and tranquiljust salary;"
2
ity." S
The EZLN's military demands were: (1) that the Mexican government
recognize the EZLN as a "belligerent force," thus protected by the applicable
international conventions and treaties; (2) to obtain indemnification for the
families whose shacks and belongings were destroyed by the bombings of the
Federal Army; (3) to stop the expulsions of indigenous peoples from their
communities conducted by "caciques supported by the State;" and (4) "[t]o
respect the lives of all members of the EZLN." 2 9
Finally, the EZLN included demands to address the special and urgent
needs of indigenous women in that part of Mexico, such as: (1) "[m]aternity
clinics with gynecologists;" (2) child care centers; (3) food for children; (4)
kitchens and dining areas for children; (5) corn grinding and tortilla establishments; (6) rural farms to grow chickens, rabbits, sheep; (7) a bakery; and
(8) handicraft shops."
As a consequence of the shocking assassination of the PRI presidential
candidate, Luis Donaldo Colossio, 3 1 the negotiations between the government of Mexico and the EZLN were immediately suspended. On May 4,
1994, as a result of a meeting held in Las Margaritas between Camacho
Solis, Subcomandante Marcos and Bishop Ruiz, a joint communiqu6 was
issued informing the Mexican people that the consultations between the

26. Demandas y Compromisos, supra note 24, at 48-49.
27. Id. at 52, 53, 56 and 59 respectively.
28. Id. at 56, 57, 60, 62 and 64 respectively.
29. Id. at 50, 63-64 and 67 respectively.
30. Id. at 65.
31. Geri Smith, Mexico: Will Economic Reform Survive the Turmoil?, Bus. WEEK. Apr. 11,
1994, at 24; Elias ChAvez, El Asesinato de Colosio Descompone al Pals, PROCESO, Mar. 28,
1994, at 16; Martin Moreno, Nadie cuid6 su Espalda, and Tarde Trdgica en Tjuana; se
Consum6 el Magnicidio, EPOCA, Mar. 28, 1994, at 8 and 10, respectively.
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EZLN and the federal government had been re-initiated.32
However, it appears that these consultations were destined to fail. Only

a month after they were started, Mr. Camacho resigned as Peace Commissioner33 because of a political clash with Dr. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n,
the new presidential candidate appointed by the PRI to succeed Colosio.)
This led President Salinas to appoint Lic. Jorge Madrazo Cu6llar, until then
head of the government's National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH),

as the new Commissioner for Reconciliation and Peace. 5

Very little progress was accomplished by Lic. Madrazo as Peace

Commissioner. Less than a week after he rendered the fourth annual report
of the creation of the CNDH,36 the EZLN rejected the proposals made by
the Federal government.37 In October of 1994, the peace negotiations broke

off again.
As soon as he took office as President of Mexico on December 1, 1994,
Dr. Ernesto Zedillo stated that he was "convinced that it is possible to begin
a new peace negotiation in Chiapas." 3" However, on December 18, 1994,
the EZLN mobilized its forces, occupying the town of Simojovel, in what
was considered to be the most serious provocation since both sides agreed to
a cease fire a year ago.39 Two days later, the Mexico peso was devalued.' A few days later, Subcomandante Marcos agreed with the government to extend the cease fire. 41 Negotiations then began through the

"National Commission of Arbitration and Mediation" (CONAI), headed by

32. G. Correa & J.C. L6pez, Se Reinician las Consultas Zapatistas, PROCESO, May 9, 1994,
at 40.
33. Mr. Camacho resigned as Peace Commissioner on June 17, 1994. In his letter of resignation to President Salinas, Lic. Camacho suggested that he could no longer contribute to the
construction of the peace effort because Dr. Ernesto Zedillo had undermined his political ability
to succeed in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. Ted Bardake, Negotiator Resigns in
Mexico; Camacho Questions Party's Commitment, WASH. POST, June 18, 1994, at A18.
34. Id. Until the tragedy of Tijuana occurred, Dr. Zedillo had been in charge of directing
the presidential political campaign of Lic. Colosio. Dr. Zedillo had already been a close
collaborator of President Salinas, serving in his administration as Secretary of Public Education
(SEP). A Yale-educated economist, Dr. Zedillo distinguished himself within the ranks of the
PRI. Charles Wilbanks, A Technocratic Solution: Few Surprises as Salinas Chooses Former
Education Secretary as PRI's New Candidate, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), Apr. 4, 1994-Apr. 10,
1994, at 14.
35. President Salinas appointed Lic. Madrazo on June 23, 1994, subject to the formality of
obtaining the CNDH's Board of Directors' approval. See New Peace Envoy Named in Mexico,
WASH. POST, June 24, 1994, at A32.
36. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. Sallie Hughes, A New President Takes Office, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), Dec. 5,
1994, at 14.
39. Michael Tangeman, Zapatistas Coordinate Show of Force, then Vanish Without Firing
a Shot, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 1, 1995, at 3.
40. Jo Bedingfield, Peso Falls Against Dollar, Stock Market Sent Reeling, Interest Rates
Up, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 1, 1995, at 1.
41. Michael Tangeman, Breakthrough in Talks: Tensions Diminish in Southern Mexico, but
Peace Seems Remote, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 1, 1995, at 3.
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Bishop Samuel Ruiz. 2
From an international law perspective, the EZLN rebellion in Chiapas
offers two intriguing developments, unprecedented in the history of Mexico,
namely: (1) its intimate relationship with NAFTA, an international trade instrument; 43 and (2) the focus of the EZLN's demands on the respect for
human rights.
This article attempts to embrace a number of objectives. First, it
provides information regarding the armed campesino uprising in Chiapas,
exploring its genesis and giving special attention to the tragic conditions
which affect the indigenous peoples in that part of Mexico. Second, it
analyzes the main demands advanced by the EZLN. Third, it documents
human rights violations committed by the Mexican Army, as reported by
Mexican and international journalists, as well as by U.S. and Mexican human
rights organizations. Fourth, it provides an analysis of the impact that the
EZLN movement is likely to produce in Mexico, and abroad, in relation to
certain political, legal, economic and cultural issues. And, finally, it
discusses the effect of NAFTA on the promotion of human rights in Mexico.
I. CHIAPAS, THE REBELLION AND NAFTA

A. The State of Chiapas
"The Mexican State of Chiapas has long been notedfor its physical
beauty, natural wealth and oppressed indigenouspopulation."4
Chiapas, Mexico's most southern state, borders Guatemala.4' Not only
physically, but politically and economically, Chiapas is a part of Central

America. With a total population of 3.2 million, the indigenous population
amounts to almost one million, most of them fluent in Mayan, although nine
other authochtonous languages are also spoken throughout the state.'

Two

million residents have less than elementary school education, with an official
42. Id.
43. The rebellion started precisely on January 1, 1994, the official date of the entering into
force of NAFTA. See NAFTA, supra note 1. In its document of formal demands, the EZLN
expressly requested that NAFTA should be "revised" to incorporate the needs and interests of
indigenous peoples. See Demandas y Compromisos, Demand No. 7, supra note 24, at 52.
44. CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at vii.
45. Originally, Chiapas belonged to Guatemala. On September 12, 1824, by means of an "Act
of Incorporation," the Province of "Chiapa" separated from Guatemala and united with the
Republic of Mexico, as a result of a plebescite (96,829 in favor, 64,400 against). Two days
later, on September 14, 1824, the Province of Chiapa was solemnly declared part of the Mexican
Federation. Mexico's Federal government incorporated Chiapas as a state (i.e. "Estado de las
Chiapas"), under the Federal Constitution of October 4, 1824. The first Constitution of the state
was approved on November 19, 1825, and published on February 18, 1826. Estado de Chiapas,
Historia, 3 ENCICLOPEDIA DE MEXICO 595-619 (Jose Rogelio Alvarez, Director 1977)
46. S. Lynne Walker, Chiapas, Mexico, Too Little, Too Late: Rebel Uprising Exposes
Holes in Salinas' Safety Net for the Poor, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 11, 1994, at A8.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994

7

8

California Western
International
Law Journal,
Vol. JOURNAL
25, No. 1 [1994],[Vol.
Art. 2 25
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

illiteracy rate recognized at 30%. 4 At least 1.1 million Chiapanecos live
in communities without electricity, 1.3 million live in communities without
running water, and 1.6 million in houses with dirt floors." According to
the Secretariat of Social Development (Sedesol), 2.5 million residents earn
less than $7 a day.49 The World Bank figures place earnings of the Indian
population of the state at $350, or less, a year.5 0
Rebellions by indigenous peoples have been occurring in Chiapas since
colonial times. 5 ' For historians, anthropologists and human rights advocates,
the works of Fray Bartolom6 de las Casas52 epitomize the ardent defense of
indigenous peoples."
Chiapas is Mexico's poorest state for Indians, but a paradise for
caciques.' Since early this century, caciques have been the most powerful
people in Chiapas, both politically and economically.55 From a political
viewpoint, all of today's caciques in Chiapas are members of the PRI.56
The PRI has long been in control of Mexico's political landscape.57 Today,
the PRI claims control of 90% of the votes in Chiapas." As such, no
authority, from a modest police officer to the Governor of the State, can
serve in any public capacity at the municipal, state or federal level in Chiapas
unless they are an official member of the PRI. Economically, caciques are
the wealthiest individuals not only in Chiapas but in Mexico at large.5 9
Following a reputation dating back centuries, caciques have been
engaged in dispossessing indigenous peoples of their lands using the most
arbitrary, illegal and violent means. Jorge Castafieda, a political scientist at
Mexico's National Autonomous University (UNAM), recently wrote: "For

47. Id. at 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Jane Bussy, Mexico's Political System Under Siege, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE
(Opinion), Feb. 22, 1994, at B-7.
51. An uprising was reported as early as 1527, six years after the Spanish conquest. Daniel
Dombey, Mexico Revolt Set to Go On. Uprising in Chiapas, NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Jan.
14, 1994, at 10.
52. See LEWIS HANKE, BARTOLOMI DE LAS CASAS: PENSADOR, POLTICO, HISTORIADOR,
ANTROP6LOGO (1949); RAM6N MENtNDEZ PIDAL, EL PADRE LAS CASAS: Su DOBLE
PERSONALIDAD (1963).
53. Fray Bartolome de las Casas was the Dominican priest who became bishop of Chiapas in
1544 and spoke against the cruelties associated with the Spanish land-tenure system of
Encomiendas. Known as "The Father of the Indians," De Las Casas became a celebrated author
in sixteenth century Europe because of his book TRATADO PRIMERO: BREVISIMA RELACI6N DE
LA DESTRUCCI6N DE LAS INDIAS (1552). For a modem version of this work, see BARTOLOME
DE LAS CASES, TRATADOS (Lewis Hanke & Manuel Gim6nez Fernandez, eds., 1966).
54. See CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at 3.
55. MERILEE SERRIL GRINOLE, BUREAUCRATS, POLITICIANS, AND PEASANTS IN MEXICO

126 (1977).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 146.
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decades, the local authorities and the army worked with the cattle ranchers
in dispossessing the Indians of their communal lands; the ranchers got the
land, while the Army and the police beat up, harassed and intimidated the
previous owners."'
The strategy that caciques and ranchers have followed has been a
relatively simple one. Over the years, in a gradual but undeterred movement,
"the Indians have been driven across the state from the fertile lands along the
Pacific coast to the central highlands and, finally, to the Lacandon rain forest
in the east-the region in Chiapas least suited for agriculture." 6' According
to June Nash, an American anthropologist who studies the Tzetzal group,
even in the Lacandon rain forest, the interests of the Indians "have taken a
back seat to commercial enterprises backed by the State. They would let the
Indians move in and clear the land. Then, as soon as they got it in usable
shape, the loggers and ranchers would force them out-without any
compensation." 6 2 The Mexican government, instead of applying the law
when landowners have pushed Indian communities off their land, "has turned
a blind eye to the low-intensity violence. Torture, killings and illegal arrests
in Chiapas and neighboring Oaxaca prompted Amnesty International to write
its first report on the human rights situation in Mexico in 1986. "63 This
explains why Chiapas, whose population accounts for a mere 4% of
Mexico's population, is involved in 25-30% of Mexico's land disputes.'
Chiapas is endowed with vast natural resources. It supplies large
amounts of oil, cocoa, beef, sugar, and coffee to the rest of the country. It
is also the locale of a major hydroelectric project that provides electric power
to a large portion of Mexico, and the site of intense geological explorations
conducted by PEMEX, the federal parastate oil monopoly. However, until
very recently, Chiapas has been economically abandoned by the federal
government.
In recent years, President Salinas de Gortari has targeted Chiapas as a
major recipient of his anti-poverty campaign, known as Mexico's National

60. David Luhnow, The Dispute over Land in Chiapas, S. F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1994,
reprintedin MEXICO. A READER ON THE UPRISING INCHIAPAS 104 (1994) [hereinafter THE
UPRISING IN CHIAPAS].

61. Id. These human intrusions into the delicate habitat of the Lacandon rain forest and jungle,
generally followed by a process of intense deforestation and colonization to open up areas for
agricultural purposes, has led to the gradual but systematic destruction of the rain forest over
the last two decades. Of the original 5,000-square miles of the Selva Lacandona in southern
Mexico, only 30% remains, despite the enactment of underfunded and unenforced environmental
protection decrees. Christine Toomey, Viva Zapata!and Mexico Trembles, SUNDAY TIMEs Jan.
9, 1994.
62. Tod Robberson, How Mexico Brewed a Rebellion, Economic 'Progress' Trampled Indian
Farms, WASH. POST., Jan. 9, 1994, at A-21.
63. Bussey, supra note 50, at B-7.
64. Id. Catholic Bishop Samuel Ruiz has stated: "The Indians have been forced-through
bribery, trickery and outright thuggery-from their traditional lands into increasingly more
marginalized lands. Now they have been forced into the jungle by the caciques and are fighting
back." Id.
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Solidarity Program.' Since taking office in December of 1988, after
winning a highly contested presidential election, President Salinas channeled
$12 billion into this program to introduce basic services and some infrastructure works in Mexico's poorest states. 66
The state of Chiapas, which is the poorest in the country, received
approximately $727 million to finance 8,869 public works "ranging from
gravel roads to basketball courts. "67 However, these federally-funded
social-oriented programs have been hampered by opposition from caciques
and government officials, and by corruption.'
A confidential document written by highly-placed officials in the federal
government, blamed the then governor of the state, Patrocinio Gonzlez
Garrido, "not only for permitting a feudal land system to persist but also for
helping large landowners repress Indian peasants. . . . In 1992, he had

ordered the arrest of three Solidarity officials on charges of fraud, embezzlement and corruption after they refused to let him administer federal antipoverty funds," said Neil Harvey, an assistant professor of political science

at Brown University.'
Recent reports indicate that the Solidarity program has been a failure in
Chiapas. Several reasons appear to be associated with this failure. Such
reasons include: the novelty of the program; its use to accomplish political

gains; the construction of works with little or no interest to the local people;
and corrupt practices.
However, the strongest opposition has been erected by President Salinas'
natural political allies: the wealthy ranchers and caciques members of the
PRI. These powerful political actors are by no means ready to change the

conditions of oppression and injustice that they so successfully imposed for

65. Created on President Salinas' first day of his six-year tenure, the Solidarity Program
(ProgramaNacional de Solidaridad, or PRONASOL) is "an umbrella organization aimed at
developing health, education, nutrition, housing, employment, infrastructure, and other
productive projects to benefit 17 million Mexicans living in extreme poverty." PRONASOL has
been described as "the core element of the Salinas administration's formula for maintaining
political control." MIGUEL A. CENTENO, DEMOCRACY WITHIN REASON. TECHNOCRATIC
REVOLUTION IN MEXICO 65 (1994).

66. Walker, supra note 46, at Al.
67. Id. at A1, A8.
68. Id. This article acknowledges that solidarity's effectiveness in Chiapas
has been hampered by opposition from local landowners known as caciques, who
benefited from the poverty of peasants; by resentment by some governors to
Solidarity's ability to build an alternative power base in their states; and by oldfashioned corruption. . . The profound poverty of the region permitted caciques to
put Indians to work as virtual slaves, giving them only room and board in exchange
for their backbreaking labor on huge cattle ranches.
Id.
69. According to the confidential document, Chiapas Gov. Gonz.lez Garrido "allowed
caciques to run peasants off their land, jailed entire villages when there was resistance and
ordered the arrest of as many as 50 mayors in towns throughout the state." Id.
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decades upon the poorest people of the state. This is especially so considering that their illegal and abusive practices were not secretly done. Such
absolute
practices were conducted in an open and regular manner, with
70
impunity and political disregard from the federal government.
B. The Roots of the Rebellion
7
"Time has stood still in Chiapas. It appears like a historicanachronism." 1

Hundreds, probably thousands, of journalistic accounts have been
published throughout the world since the Chiapas rebellion started on January
1, 1994.72 Most of these reports are in agreement in identifying the same
factors as the roots of the uprising.
One factor contributing to the rebellion was the chronic conditions of
abject misery and abandonment which prevail in villages and small towns
where indigenous peoples live. In the words of Subcomandante Marcos,
"[w]e have nothing, absolutely nothing. Not a dignified roof, nor work, nor
land, nor health care, nor education." 3 In an article in the New Statesman
and Society, one writer acknowledged: "[t]he Indians of Chiapas-Tzotziles,
Tzetales, Choles, Tojobales, Mames, Zoques and mestizos-may have been
driven to the very margins. But the fibre of their resistance across five
centuries of terrible oppression, had remained strong."'
In San Crist6bal alone, where unemployment exceeds 60 percent, Mexican
giovernment census bureau statistics report that 78 percent of the population
ive in overcrowded shacks with dirt floors, 66 percent of which lack electricity, 40 percent lack sewers and water. More than 40 percent of the
people are illiterate and 62 percent never completed sixth grade.'
Other causes of the rebellion were the constant abuses and repeated
illegal acts committed for decades against indigenous peoples by caciques,
cattle ranchers and public authorities, including the public authorities of the

70. In spite of the fact that President Salinas knew of the negative reputation associated with

the then Governor of Chiapas, Patrocinio GonzAlez Garrido, President Salinas rewarded Mr.
GonzAlez, a member of the PRI, by appointing him to the most powerful political post in the
Mexican cabinet, Secretary of the Interior (Secretariode Gobernaci6n). A few days after the
uprising in Chiapas, Gonzdlez Garrido was forced to submit his resignation.

Tod Robberson.

Mexican Cabinet Shake-Up Called Sign of Willingness to Talk with Rebels, WASH. POST, Jan.
12, 1994, at A-13.
71. Monsignor Samuel Ruiz Garcia, Bishop of San Crist6bal de las Casas, Chiapas.
McDonnell, supra note 6, at 33.
72. Regarding the causes of the conflict, see McDonnell, supra note 6; Cockburn & Murray,
supra note 3; Toomey, supra note 61; Susan Ferris, Roots of Mexico Uprising: Poverty,
Repression Spawned Revolt, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Jan. 4, 1994, at A-1.
73. Michael S. Serrill, Zapata'sRevenge, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 33.
74. Cockburn & Murray, supra note 3, at 20.
75. Bill Coleman & Patty Coleman, Government Blames Church for Chiapas: Mexican
Uprising Fed on Poverty, Oppression, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, Jan. 14, 1994, at 6.
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state and the Mexican Army. One writer noted, "[t]he problem is that the
authoritarian, corrupt, oligarchical structures that have characterized Chiapas
for decades were left untouched-or even were strengthened . . . . In fact,
the main problem in Chiapas is not economic but political." 76
A third cause of the rebellion was the realization by indigenous peoples
that the political, legal and economic systems established by the state in
Chiapas, and in Mexico as a whole, are being utilized to exacerbate their
exploitation and ignore their demands, possibly leading towards their
eventual extermination. "Police, soldiers and landowners' private militias
ruthlessly enforce the will of cattle barons and other powerful interests-not
infrequently including drug traffickers. As Mexico hurtles towards the
millennium, Chiapas is mired somewhere in a feudal past."' "[T]raditionally in Chiapas ...the state government distributed the Solidarity funds for
political reasons. . . . We have never seen the funds distributed in the
communities for the purpose of eliminating poverty."'I
Finding a solution to these types of problems requires the creation of a
new and complex policy with a proper mechanism for its effective implementation. The formulation of this policy should not be left solely in the hands
of the government of Mexico but, rather, should be undertaken as a national
commitment with the participation of all Mexicans.
This new policy has to take into account a number of guiding principles.
First, indigenous peoples must be recognized as individuals endowed with
constitutionally-protected rights, including human rights at the personal and
collective level. This recognition should come both from the government and
from mestizos alike.
Second, the new policy should include the dismantling of the traditional
economic system as it exists in Chiapas today, and elsewhere in Mexico.
The traditional economic system was constructed upon the negation of the
rights and the exploitation of indigenous peoples. Third, the new policy
must address the need to overhaul the court system in Mexico. In order to
truly impart justice to indigenous people, the courts must sanction the abuses
of authorities and wealthy Mexicans and, in particular, do away with its
obsolescence, inefficiency and corruption.
Finally, the new policy should change the political landscape in Mexico.
This change should not only address the elimination of fraudulent electoral
practices, but should also promote the installation of true democracy.
C. NAFTA and the Indigenous Peoples of Mexico
The rebels in Chiapas were against NAFTA because this trilateral

76. Jorge G. Castafteda, The Other Mexico Reveals Itself, L.A. TIMES (Op-Ed), Jan. 5, 1994,
reprintedin THE UPRISING INCHIAPAS, supra note 60, at 2.
77. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 32.
78. Walker, supra note 46, at A-8.
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agreement was expected to destroy the existing economic system in rural
areas, where most indigenous peoples are located. Consequently, the Mayan
Indians of Chiapas identified NAFTA as the instrument likely to terminate
their economic sustenance, their culture and, in one word, their existence.
According to this train of thought, NAFTA was created for the benefit
of Mexico's political and business elite. The international agreement was
negotiated by government officials who did not contemplate the interests,
needs, and priorities of the Mexican indigenous peoples.79
In general, campesinos and ejidatariosin Chiapas have barely survived
by cultivating small parcels of land, to grow corn, beans and vegetables
using the most primitive technology. Those small parcels of land, known as
ejidos, ° were given to rural communities to use pursuant to Article 27 of
Mexico's 1917 Constitution as a reaction against the vast land properties
(latifundios), amassed by a few wealthy families during the Porfirio Diaz
regime and in compliance with the goals advanced by Zapata. 8 However,
as part of his overall economic policies, President Salinas proposed an
amendment to Article 27 of the Constitution in 1992, in order to do away
with ejidos and to encourage U.S.-style agri-business and new latifundios
designed for export economy-mass production.' "Small farmers feared that
cheap, mass-produced U.S. foodstuffs would overwhelm their meager
production of corn and beans." 83
Therefore, the indigenous peoples in Chiapas rose in arms as a symbolic
cry to accomplish several objectives. One was to get the attention of the
government of Mexico. A second objective was to appeal to other impoverished Mexicans in a similar situation. According to the World Bank, 32
million of Mexico's total population of 85 million "still live in poverty."'"
The Mexican government reports that
the wealthiest 10 percent of the population
national income, while the poorest 1Opercent
... Mexicans living below the poverty line
population. . . . the number of billionaires

captures 38 percent of the
receives only 1.55 percent.
comprise 40 percent of the
rose from two in 1988 to

79. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 33.
80. An ejido is a relatively small tract of land granted collectively to a group of campesinos
(known as ejidatarios) who live in a given rural community. The ejidatarioswork the land
according to the decisions of the majority of ejidatarios, taken by an elected and representative
body known as Comiti Ejidal. See CONST., art. 27 (Mex.); ANTONIO LUNA ARRAJO & Luis
G. ALCERRERA, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO AGRARIO 262-65 (1982).
81. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 33.
82. Id. For further discussion of the amendment to article 27, see infra section II.C.2.b.
83. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 33. A similar argument is advanced by Robberson, when he
writes: "By forcing Mexico to phase out subsidies on the main cash crops here-corn, sugar and
coffee-NAFTA's negotiators have cut off vital sources of support for indigenous farmers."
Robberson, supra note 62, at A3 1. See also Anthony DePalma, Mexicans Fearfor Corn,
Imperiled by Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A3.
84. Toomey, supra note 61.
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thirteen last year, a 700 percent jump.85
A third objective was to send a message to other countries in Latin
America. The unfair distribution of wealth and the systematic violation of
human rights, especially those of indigenous peoples, is not the exception but
the rule in most Latin American countries. For example, in Guatemala, a
country of 10 million people, human rights groups report that "more than
100,000 people have been killed, 45,000 have fled refugee camps into
neighboring Mexico and another 45,000 have disappeared . . . ." A
professor at the University of Los Andes in Bogoti, Colombia, pointed out
that "Mexico is now a mirror for the rest of Latin America, showing the
weaknesses of economic reforms that do not come accompanied by
democratization or solutions for the masses."87
Finally, the rebels wanted to attract the interest and attention of the
international community at large and the United States in particular. A
couple of weeks after the rebellion started in Mexico, two Representatives
from California sent a letter to President Salinas de Gortari asking him "to
investigate possible human rights abuses by the [Mexican] Army in the
Chiapas state revolt." 8 The letter was co-signed by more than twenty other
congressional supporters of NAFTA and it urged the Mexican government
to conduct the investigation rather than relying on Mexico's National
Commission on Human Rights, "which has been criticized for failing to
fairly investigate cases in the past."" In a similar vein, Human Rights
Watch, citing violations of core political rights in Mexico, wrote to President
Clinton in late 1993, urging him to address these and other human rights
issues during trade negotiations with Mexico.'
II. THE EZLN, ITS DEMANDS AND SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS

A. The Chiapas Uprising was Obscuredby NAFTA
Guerrilla movements have not been officially recognized in Mexico
during the last two decades. 9' However, rumors have been circulating for

85. Jane Bussey, 7he Ghost of Zapata, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 20, 1994, at F-1.
86. Andy Messing, Regional Turmoil in Guatemala, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, at A-15.
87. David L. Marcus, Troubles in Mexico Alarm its Neighbors to the South, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 27, 1994, at 31-A; see also Michael S. Serrill, A Litany of Latin
American Troubles, TIME, Jan. 17, 1994, at 34.
88. Pelosi, Eshoo Ask Mexico to ProbeArmy Tactics, S. F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 17, 1994, at A8.
89. Id.
90. 5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUB. No. B-510, HRW WRITES TO PRESIDENT CLINTON
URGING NAFTA SUMMIT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (1993).

91. Tod Robberson, Bloody Indian Revolt Continues In Mexico. Government calls Rebels a
Small Group of Provocateurs,WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1994, at A-I, A-13.
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years concerning the presence of some guerrilla activity in southern
Mexico.' U.S. military intelligence analysts prepared reports of guerrilla
activity in Chiapas in the summer of 1993.1
Prior to the armed uprising in Chiapas, the policy of the Mexican
government was principally directed at lobbying the U.S. Congress to secure
the passage of NAFTA. Its aim was to promote Mexico as a politically
stable country, interested in attracting foreign investment.
Therefore, the policy of the Mexican authorities was to simply deny, at
the federal as well as the local level, the existence of guerrilla movements or

to downplay the aggravation of campesino problems in the area. Thus,
Chiapas Attorney General Joaquin Armendi.riz told reporters in June of
1993, after a reported Army encounter with an armed group that "there are
no guerrillas in this state. This alarm is definitely false and comes from
people trying to discredit the government and create anxiety among its
94
citizenry. "'
In early January, 1994, the U.S. Department of State denied reports

circulating in Mexico that "the United States knew that a guerrilla force was
growing up in the backlands of Chiapas." A senior official added that "[t]he
rebellion took us completely by surprise. "9

The highest political priority of the Mexican government during the
second half of 1993, was securing the passage of NAFTA by the U.S.
Congress. Thus, any negative publicity that could jeopardize the passage of
NAFTA-such as the presence of armed guerrilla groups, unhappy with the
government and likely to disrupt the image of a politically stable nation-was
bound to be quickly suppressed by the Mexican authorities.

92. According to a journalistic report, a Mexican from Chiapas who is familiar with peasant
organizations said that "the Zapatista army had trained for five years in a remote area and
appeared to have 'romantic' ideas about its strength." Susan Ferris, Recipe for Rebellion, THE
GAZETTE (Montreal), Jan. 5, 1994, at A-1. Another report stated that "there were premonitions,
sporadic armed struggles two years ago, and no one paid any attention." Cockburn & Murray,
supra note 3, at 21. The Mexico City magazine PROCESO reported in September of 1993 that
.armed indigenous groups were training in Chiapas." Robberson, supra note 91, at A-13.
93. The existence of such reports was disclosed by Robberson, supra note 14, at A-21. Col.
Steve Wagner, a specialist on Mexico's Army at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, is
reported in this article as saying that "he believed that... [the Mexican Army] was aware of
guerrilla movements in the area but may have been blocked by the civilian leadership from
taking action. The [Mexican] Army is well-read in what's going on, he said. [T]hey have an
informal intelligence network down there." Id.
94. Robberson, supra note 14, at A-21. David Ronfeldt, a Rand Corporation analyst who
specializes in the Mexican military, declared to The Washington Post that "signs of guerrilla
activity had been apparent for several months, particularly after a widely-reported firefight last
summer between the [Mexican] Army and unidentified guerrillas near the Lacandonan rain forest
in eastern Chiapas." Id.
95. John M. Goshko, Balancing Trade Pact and Human Rights In Mexico: Mayan Rebellion
in Chiapas could Bring Criticism of Clinton Administration Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994,
at A-30.
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B. El Subcomandante Marcos
Most of the communiquds distributed by the EZLN to the press are
written by Subcomandante Marcos.96 In the opinion of a U.S. writer,
"[H]e has penned witty, brash and detailed correspondence, spicing political
dogma with references to films, soap operas and books. Although he acknowledged that the Zapatistas cannot defeat the Army in a military faceoff,
Marcos vanquished the government on the propaganda front. "I
The ideas and writings of Subcomandante Marcos are illustrated in the
"Declaration of War," issued by the EZLN:
To the Mexican people we are the product of 500 years of struggle. We
say: enough! We are the descendants of the original conceivers of our
common identity. We are the dispossessed mass, and we call to each of
you to join in this single cause so that we may not starve to death 9under the
70-year-old dictatorship led by a self-appointed band of traitors. "
To the government it does not matter that we are dying of hunger and
curable diseases; that we have nothing, absolutely nothing: a decent roof
over our heads, nor land, nor work, nor health, food or education. Without
the right to elect our officials freely and democratically. Without autonomy, peace or justice for our children. We are fully aware that the war we
have declared is the last, yet the only, just measure we have."
Later, in response to the formal offer of a pardon to the insurgents,
made by the government of Mexico, Subcomandante Marcos wrote:
Why do we have to be pardoned? What are we going to be pardoned for?
Of not dying of hunger? Of not being silent in our misery? Of not humbly
picked
and the outcast? Of having
the despised
rolefound
of being
historic
accepting
upour
arms
after we
all other
roads closed?
Of not having paid
attention to the Chiapas Penal Code, one of the most absurd and repressive
in history? Of having demonstrated to the rest of the country and the entire
world that human diVity still lives, even among some of the world's
poorest peoples?...
The administration of President Salinas de Gortari, through the
Secretariat of the Interior, in early January, 1994, denied that the rebellion
is an indigenous movement or a peasant farmer action. Instead, it claimed the
rebellion was the work of professionals who were manipulating the disaffected. 10' The government speculated that "foreigners-possibly Guatemalans
and Salvadorans with experience in guerrilla warfare after lengthy civil wars

96. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 42.
97. Id.
98. John Santos, ChiapasRevolt Spotlights Human Rights, 30 NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER
Jan. 21, 1994, at 10. See also Serrill, supra note 10, at 32-33.
99. Toomey, supra note 61.
100. Cockburn & Murray, supra note 3, at 22.
101. Toomey, supra note 61.
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in those countries-provided the training."' °
However, there was no
evidence to support these claims.
While attending the World Economic Forum at Davos, in Switzerland,
President Salinas de Gortari described the rebellion as "a local problem in
a region with deep poverty [involving] a well-trained and educated armed
group with a radical ideology."" He emphasized that Mexico was "determined to solve the problem through political means and not through
force. " 10

C. The EZLN and its Thirty-FourDemands
Following the cease fire and the declaration of amnesty extended to the
EZLN by President Salinas de Gortari on January 5, 1994, and the
appointment of Lic. Camacho as Commissioner of Peace and Reconciliation, 15 both parties engaged in a series of intensive consultations.
The EZLN took the initiative by submitting to Lic. Camacho thirty-four
"Demands and Engagements"" ° to be considered and answered by the
government of Mexico. Once this document was studied by President Salinas
de Gortari and his advisors, a press conference was held in San Crist6bal de
las Casas on March 2, 1994, during which a specific answer was given by
the Mexican government to each of the petitions advanced by the EZLN.11
This official declaration is the most important document articulating the
position of the negotiating parties.
A brief analysis of Mexico's responses is indispensable both to reach an
understanding of the political philosophy of each of the contending parties
and to evaluate the concessions apparently extended to the EZLN by the
government of Mexico. In order to proceed in a more systematic manner,
the thirty-four demands advanced by the EZLN, and the respective answers
given by the government, have been substantively divided into the following
five large categories: (1) political; (2) legal; (3) socio-economic; (4) military;
and (5) women's demands.' °

102. Eloy Cantd, an official of Gobernaci6n, called the rebels "professionals of violence" and
added that "many came from neighboring Guatemala..." The Mexican authorities are reported
as saying that "the well-organised and well-financed nature of the guerrilla movement suggested
ties to arms and drug smugglers in the region," blaming the "Roman Catholic radicals for
inciting the peasants." Id.
103. David Crane, Mexico Pursues Aggressive Trade Strategy, Salinas Does Not Want to
Depend on NAFTA Alone, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 30, 1994, at A-16.
104. Robert Evans, Salinas Tells Investors Mexico is Stable Despite Revolt, THE REUTER
EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPORT, Jan. 29, 1994.
105. Robberson, supra note 20, at A-18.
106. Demandas y Compromisos, supra note 24; app. 2.
107. Id.
108. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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1. Political Demands
The political demands are the most serious and delicate matters raised by
the EZLN. These demands go to the core of Mexico's political system,
characterizing it as illegitimate, corrupt and under the exclusive control of
the PRI.'19
First, the EZLN demanded that national elections be "truly free and
democratic" with equal rights and obligations for political organizations
seeking power and authentic freedom to choose one or the other proposition
and respect for the will of the majority." 0 The implication of this demand
is that national elections in Mexico have not been free or democratic, but
manipulated by the PRI. As a consequence, the EZLN demanded an
authentic election: truly free, fair and democratic.
Second, in order to have "truly free and democratic" elections, the
EZLN demanded the resignation of the head of the Federal Executive and of
the heads of the State executives that came to power through electoral
fraud."' Their legitimacy, the EZLN added, does not come from the
"respect for the will of the majority, but rather from its usurpation."112 As
a political sequitur of this demand, the EZLN considered necessary the
formation of a government of transition to implement equality and respect for
all political views."'
The EZLN implied that the election of President Salinas de Gortari in
1988 was not "truly free and democratic," but was possibly rigged by the
government and the PRI, so these two entities could continue to keep their
political control over Mexico. This is evident from the EZLN's demand for
President Salinas de Gortari to resign, as well as the call for the formation
of a transition government.
While recognizing the "large importance" attributed to these two issues,
the government of Mexico, through its Commissioner for Peace and
Reconciliation, asserted that they were "not subject to negotiation,"
characterizing them not4 as issues demanding an answer but rather as
"rhetorical questions."
The official answer underlined the importance of
the negotiations conducted at that time by the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretariode Gobernaci6n)with the representatives of the different political
parties. The negotiations were to produce, as part of a gradual political

109. Due to space limitations, this section will only analyze the major demands advanced by
the EZLN, and the corresponding government responses, in each of the enlisted five categories.
Out of the 32 demands, the author has classified as eminently political the demands contained
in paragraphs 1, 2, 4,5, 23, 24, 30 and 32. Demandas y Comproinsos, supra note 24, at 4867; app. 2.
110. Id. at 48-49; app. 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 49.
113. Id.
114. Demandas y Compromisos (Answers to Demands 1 and 2), supra note 24, at 49-50.
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process, new electoral legislation which would guarantee democratic
elections." 5 In his answer, Commissioner Camacho emphasized:
[T]o have clean elections, equitable propositions will be followed to ensure
an impartial representation in the electoral organs, and the incorporation
of citizens and groups of citizens whose impartiality and capability are
more important than their political inclination, both in the formation of the
electoral organs and in each step of the political process.'
2. Legal Demands
The legal demands may be divided into eight groups: (a) to revise
NAFTA; (b) to amend Art. 27 of Mexico's Constitution; (c) to guarantee the
right of indigenous peoples to "truthful information;" (d) to recognize all
ethnic languages as official in Mexico; (e) to recognize the right of
indigenous peoples "to have their own government with self autonomy;" (f)
to recognize the right of indigenous peoples to have their own justice system,
according to their customs and traditions, and "without the intervention of
illegitimate and corrupt governments;" (g) that the government declare null
and void "all debts arising out of credits, loans and taxes;" and (h) "to annul
the Penal Code of Chiapas. . . because it punishes and suppresses any legal
and peaceful fight."'"
a. To Revise NAFTA
In its seventh demand, the EZLN asserted that it was necessary to revise
NAFTA since its current text does not consider the indigenous peoples and
sentences them to death for they do not have any labor skills." 8 To the
EZLN, NAFTA meant a death sentence for all indigenous peoples. 1 9
NAFTA was designed to promote agricultural projects involving
economies of scale, demanding capital-intensive technologies, a steady flow
of investment (especially direct foreign investment from the U.S.), and
efficient business management techniques."
Most of these agricultural
projects were conceived as very large export-oriented projects to the United

115. These negotiations materialized in a number of major legal changes in the electoral
process in that country. See generally Codigo FederaleInstitucianes y Procedimientos (Federal
Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures) (Mexico).
116. Demandas y Compromisos, supra note 24, at 50.
117. Id. Nos. 7-8, 10, and 13-17, 21, 27, at 52-60; app. 2. The claims in paragraphs (c),
(d), (e) and (g) will not be discussed in detail, but are to be addressed in a federal statute in
order to give full legal implementation to Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, which
recognizes Mexico as a nation with "pluriethnic composition." For additional information, see
infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text.
118. Id. at 52.
119. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 33.
120. See generally PHILIP L. MARTIN, TRADE AND MIGRATION: NAFTA AND AGRICULTURE (1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND MIGRATION].
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States, embracing certain strategic agricultural produce such as tomatoes,
cantaloupes, broccoli, oranges, lettuce, and strawberries.' 2 ' Corn, green
peppers, and beans, the basic agricultural produce used by most indigenous
peoples as their food staples, were not even considered, since Mexico's
production in these fields has been clearly deficient over the last twelve
years. 2
The government indicated that the Secretariat of Commerce and
Industrial Development (SECOFI) will undertake "a careful evaluation" of
NAFTA's impact upon "the different productive activities in the state of
Chiapas, and especially upon its indigenous communities."" Taking this
evaluation as a starting point, "special training programs will be designed to
benefit those who may be affected in their productive activities and

jobs. "124
b. To Amend Article 27 of the Constitution
The eighth demand, addressing the most serious problems associated
with land tenure in rural areas, demanded the annullment of recent amendments to Article 27 of Mexico's Constitution and called for redistribution of
land."z Article 27 of the Constitution constitutes the legal basis for any
kind of property rights in Mexico, whether public or private. 126 This
article was created by the Constitutional Congress which was held in the City
of Querdtaro in 1916-1917,127 to respond to demands for land distribution. 2 In Article 27, Congress incorporated the ejido, first created in the
"Law of Restoration and Donation of Ejidos" of January 6, 1915.129 This
action committed the government to start distributing rural lands among
campesinos in that country. 3 '
As described earlier, ejido land is a piece of rural property granted by
the Federal government to a group of campesinos (known as ejidatarios)to
work it as a collective.'
No individual property is allowed within the
ejido, which remains inalienable and protected by federal laws. 3 2 The

121. Id. at 127-28.
122. Id. at 97-99.
123. Demandas y Compromisos, supra note 24, at 52-53.
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id. app. 2.
126. CONST., art. 27 (Mex.); see also Gilberto Gutierrez Quiroz, Investment in Real
Property in Mexico: An Overview of Constitutionaland Statutory Restrictions, 12 ARIZ. L.
REV. 270, 274 (1970).
127. SIR NICHOLAS CHEETNAM, A SHORT HISTORY OF MExico 232-34 (1970).
128. Id. at 218-34.
129. Id. at 228, 234.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
132. ANTONIO LUNA ARROYO & LuIS G. ALCERRECA, DIccIONARIO DE DERECHO
AGRARIO MEXICANO 262-65 (1982)
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political process of distributing this type of land by federal government
officials to campesinos, which has lasted until today, led to the installation
by the PRI of an official program called "Agrarian Reform."' 33 However,
the ejidos have not been productive. 3 4 Some ejidatariosvoluntarily leave
their lands, which have become poor and eroded, and move to urban centers
(or to the United States) looking for brighter economic horizons, while others
are violently expelled from their lands by caciques.'35
Ejido lands have been a persistent source of very serious economic and
political problems not only for the federal but also for state and local
governments. 3 6 The chronic failure of ejido lands, on the one hand, and
the prospects of large agricultural projects created exclusively to export to the
United States as a result of NAFTA, 137 on the other, moved the administration of President Salinas to amend Article 27 of the Constitution to radically
transform the ejido system. 3 '
Two dramatic changes were introduced to the post-NAFTA version of
the ejido: individual property is now permitted and ejidatarios are legally
allowed to enter into commercial or industrial ventures'39 with individuals
or legal entities, whether Mexican or U.S. citizens or Mexican or foreign
corporations. These recent changes have been interpreted by the EZLN as
the final blow that will cause the demise of the flimsy economic base that
sustains the languid economic activities of indigenous peoples in rural areas
throughout Mexico.
In its official document, the government started by recognizing that "[i]n
Chiapas, the process of the agrarian reform as part of the Mexican Revolution is not fully completed." It added that this process is going to be
implemented through the enactment of a General Act on the Rights of
Indigenous Communities. This statute "is going to be formed based on the
demands, opinions, concerns and political agreements reached by the
indigenous communities in Chiapas and other indigenous communities" in
other parts of Mexico."

133. Wesley R. Smith, Salinas PreparesMexican Agriculturefor Free Trade, MEXICO
TRADE AND LAW REPORTER 7 (October 1992) [hereinafter Salinas Prepares];see generally
Ruiz MASSIEU, DERECHO AGRARIO REVOLUCIONARIO (1987).
134. Nava, Land Reforms in Mexico Will Affect the United States, MAQUILADORA AND
MEXICO BUSINESS REVIEW 20 (Dec./Jan. 1993).

135. Salinas Prepares, supra note 133, at 21;

CONQUEST CONTINUED,

supra note 12, at

61-65.
136. See generally Salinas Prepares, supra note 133.
137. See TRADE AND MIGRATION, supra note 120, at 97-105.
138. Id.
139. Salinas Prepares, supra note 133, at 19.
140. Commissioner Camacho indicated that the respective legislative bill, regulatory of Art.
4 of the Constitution, was to be submitted to the Federal Congress in April of 1994. Demandas
y Compromisos, supra note 24, at 53.
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c. The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Have Their Own Justice System
The Mexican government gave one of the most detailed answers to this
demand. It asserted that it would "promote amendments" at the state level
to the Constitution and the power of the judiciary and the police in order to
create judicial districts coinciding geographically with indigenous communities.'41 These amendments would provide that the judges in these districts
"may be Indians themselves or Mestizo professionals respected in indigenous
communities; be familiar with Mexico's positive law; and be willing to
always take into consideration the [indigenous peoples] usages and customs
in adjudicating their controversies. "142
The government also agreed to create special arrangements to treat
indigenous peoples in a fair and adequate manner, in penal and labor
proceedings, including the creation of a District Attorney's Office for the
Defense of Indigenous Peoples. 43 Finally, the Mexican government agreed
"to proceed with an exhaustive inspection regarding the legal situation of
those persons who are in jail as a result of social conflicts, as well as all the
cases of indigenous peoples whose legal situation permits them to be freed
soon. "144
d. To Repeal the Penal Code of the State of Chiapas
This is the most concise demand advanced by the EZLN. It calls for
repeal of the Penal Code of Chiapas because it does not allow indigenous
people to get organized save for the use of weapons, since any "legal and
peaceful struggle is punished and repressed." 45 Indeed, the Penal Code
of Chiapas deserves to be included among the most repressive in Mexico and
possibly in Latin America. This is not only because it lists a long enumeration of crimes against public authorities, public order, and the State itself, but
also because of the imposition of very severe penalties for such crimes,
which usually include imprisonment and stiff fines.
A rapid review of this Penal Code suffices to produce the following
typical examples: Articles 120 through 149 enunciate numerous "Crimes
against the Internal Security of the State," such as rebellion, conspiracy,
sedition, public disorder, prohibited weapons, terrorism, criminal associa-

141. Id. at 59.
142. Id.
143. In Spanish, the Procuradurade Defensa de los Indfgenas. This state office would be
staffed with bilingual personnel and its head will be appointed by the State Congress by a
qualified majority from proposals submitted by indigenous communities and after taking into
consideration the opinion of the citizens. Id.
144. The amendments in question were to be submitted to the local Congress. Id.
145. Demandas y Compromisos, Demand No. 27, supra note 24, at 64.
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tions and gangsterism.' 4 Articles 150 through 173, titled "Crimes Against
Authorities" enumerate crimes against public roads and highways, disobedience and resistance to public authorities, opposition to public works and
crimes against public servants. ""4
However, some Articles merit special comment. The crime of sedition,
detailed in Article 131, '48 applies to those who having gathered in large
numbers, but without weapons, resist public authorities or attack it to impede
the free exercise of its functions with the purpose of abolishing or amending
the State Constitution, or to suspend or destroy public institutions, or public
elections, or take public servants away from their jobs, or to subtract from
the authority of the State a part of or the entirety of the State, or to deprive
certain State powers of their functions. When the same activities take place
in opposition to the government's institutions, then the crime of rebellion is
committed. 149
Article 135 defines a "riot" as a crime when a group of individuals are
gathered in large numbers to disrupt the public order in order to exercise a
right, or to pretend that they are using one, exercising violence upon
individuals or property, or threatening public authorities, their agents or
public servants, or seriously resisting them in the exercise of their functions,
to intimidate said authority or to compel it to make a decision.' 5 0
It has been relatively easy for the Chiapas authorities and caciques to
accuse any individuals, including foreigners, but especially members of
indigenous peoples' communities, of the commission of these serious crimes.
This takes place when groups of indigenous peoples gather, for example, in
front of public offices, or when they organize public demonstrations in
streets, markets or public squares, to protest the arbitrary or criminal acts
committed by caciques, landholders, or even public authorities, including the
police and the military forces. Most protests in Chiapas (and other rural
States in Mexico) over the last decades have been organized by indigenous
peoples' groups stemming from rural problems.' 5
146. C6digos Penaly de ProcedimientosPenalespara el Estado de Chiapas, Editorial Porria,
M6xico, at 37-45 (1993).
147. Id. at 45-50.
148. Id. at 40. This crime is sanctioned with imprisonment from two to four years, and a fine
ranging between 50 and 100 times the minimum salary. Art. 132, Id.
149. Art. 120, Id. at 37. Those convicted of rebellion are imprisoned from 2 to 10 years, and
their political rights are suppressed for 5 years. Art. 121, Id.
150. Id. at 40-41. The penalty consists of 2 to 4 years in a prison and a fine up to 50 times
the minimum salary.
151. For example, THE AMERICAS WATCH REPORT stated in June of 1990:
[V]iolent evictions of peasant families are common place in Chiapas. The eviction
typically occurs with little or no warning, in the pre-dawn hours when most members
of the community are asleep. The number of police officers ... used to carry out the
evictions far exceed the number of [people] being evicted. Evictions are frequently
accompanied by warrantless arrests . . . often on trumped charges, and without
regard for what will become of the persons being evicted.
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The Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights group is one of numerous
nongovernmental organizations that have been conducting direct observations
in Chiapas in recent years, investigating agrarian conflicts, religious
intolerance, and human rights violations of indigenous peoples. Regarding the
Penal Code of Chiapas, this group concluded:
The new criminal code of the state of Chiapas has been notoriously used
by the government to oppress its citizenry. The code provides for a variety
of vaguely defined political offenses that state government officials may
selectively enforce against dissident peasants or political opponents to
maintain its tight control over the state population. The code's provisions
may be interpreted to criminalize nearly every gathering of people who
assemble publicly to protest governmental conduct or inaction. The State's
enforcement of those provisions-against even peaceful protesters-has
filled its overcrowded prisons with political prisoners.' 52
The government of Mexico answered this EZLN demand by indicating
that "[T] he current Penal Code will be repealed and that a new one will be
enacted." The new code will be oriented towards respecting constitutional
(i.e. individual guarantees) and5political
rights, and will contain a new crime:
3
the practice of rural evictions.
3. Socio-economic Demands
These demands consist of a number of specific requests directed at the
federal government to obtain hospitals, adequate housing, public transportation, schools, illiteracy programs, hunger and malnutrition programs, jobs
with a fair salary, and live in peace and tranquility."
Regarding hospitals and health care programs, the government indicated
that a special effort would be directed at modernizing and rehabilitating those
hospitals that already exist in indigenous communities. Construction of new
hospitals in other parts of the state will be subject to "the best management
of [the existing] resources. "155 However, while this reorganization takes
place, an "emergency program" will be launched. This program will be
especially directed at providing care to "all the children in the state,
including those who live in very distant communities."' 56 In addition, the

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO. A POLICY OF IMPUNITY 59
[hereinafter A POLICY OF IMPUNITY].

(June

1990)

152. CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at ix. See also infra notes 247-248.
153. Demandas y Compromisos, supra note 24, at 64. The addition of the crime of rural
eviction addresses the EZLN's Demand No. 28 which seeks an end to the evictions of indigenous peoples from their communities by caciques supported by the State a guarantee of the free
and voluntary return of all those expelled from their lands of origin and an indemnification for
their lost assets." Id.
154. See Demands 18, 26, app. 2.
155. Id. Demand No. 9, supra note 24, at 55.
156. Id.
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government agreed that "traditional medicine (i.e. ancient, herbal medicine
practiced by indigenous peoples) 'will be protected in the Regulations derived
from Articles 4 and 27 of the Constitution.' 57
Regarding the construction of adequate housing and infrastructure works,
the official document provided that the Secretariat of Social Development and
Ecology (SEDESOL) will "formulate a special program to be submitted to
the [indigenous] communities . . . and to initiate its first actions by the

second semester of 1994."

158

In the area of education, the government provided that it would endeavor
to reach an agreement with the National Union of Teachers (SNTE) to
introduce a program designed "to elevate the quality of public education in
the [Chiapas] area."' 5 9 Special emphasis was placed upon providing bilingual teachers and creating a scholarship program financed from public and
private funds to benefit indigenous communities."0
4. Military Demands
Four basic demands were advanced by the EZLN on military matters. 16' The EZLN demanded to be recognized "as a belligerent force"
subject to the application of "all the international treaties that regulate armed
conflicts." 6 z The Mexican government responded that the EZLN was
guaranteed dignified and respectful treatment, but that it was up to the EZLN
to decide the type and nature of its social or political participation in the
future. Because this participation must be within the purview of the
Constitution of the Republic, the government offered to facilitate any legal
registry to be requested by the EZLN or any of its members. 163
Regarding the EZLN's other military demands, the government indicated
that as a part of the peace agreements, monetary assistance will be given to
victims, widows and orphans of the conflict."6 The Mexican government
answered the EZLN's demand for respect for the life of its members by
stating that:
[Under] the peace agreement, the decisions included in this compromise
and the guarantees established by the Amnesty Act, not only will the life
of all the members of the EZLN be respected but it is guaranteedalso that
no penal proceedings or repressive action against said EZLN members,

157. Id.
158. Id. at 56, Demand No. 11.
159. Id. at 57, Demand No. 12.
160. Id.

161. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
162. Demandas y Compromisos, Demand No. 3, supra note 24, at 50; app. 2.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 64, Demand No. 25.
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combatants, sympathizers or collaborators will be taken.'6
5. Specific Demands Advanced by Indigenous Women
EZLN's Demand No. 29 contained twelve specific petitions for the
government to provide services ranging from maternity clinics and child care
centers to farms and handicraft shops."6 The government replied that "the
improvement of the condition of peasant and indigenous women... is one
of the most important changes advanced from Chiapas today." 67 Regarding the specific requests, the official document indicated that these demands
will form a part of the contemplated health care and training programs. All
the demands will be considered in the formulation of the respective
programs, to be designed by SEDESOL, the federal agency for the Integral
Development of the Family (Desarrollo Integral de la Familia or DIF) and
the Secretariat of Health. 168
Since these demands and official answers were made public to the people
of Mexico by the Salinas administration on March 2, 1994, very little
information has been provided by the government to validly assess the state
of implementation of the proposed official actions. Short of a trip to Chiapas,
it is difficult to know the state of progress of the numerous programs and
actions proposed by the government or the financial allocations directed at
implementing these official measures.
On June 12, 1994, the EZLN rejected the government proposals. 69
The EZLN's General Commanding Office stated that after conducting a
direct consultation in all the villages, ejidos, ranches and parajes,11 a total
of 97.88% of the total voted to reject the government peace proposals.
Regarding what steps to take if the proposal was rejected, the EZLN stated
that 3.26% voted to "renew the hostilities" while 96.74% voted "for resisting and convoking a new national dialogue.""'7 This formally ended the
"dialogue" started by the peace negotiations at San Crist6bal de las Casas.
In their communique, the EZLN agreed to extend the cease fire, not to
attack the armed forces and to allow the taking place of the forthcoming
presidential elections. In the "Second Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle"
they proposed the need for a new Constitution that will lead into another

165. Id. at 67, Demand No. 31 (emphasis added).
166. Demandas y Conpromisos, supra note 24, at 65; app. 2.
167. Id. at 66.
168. Id.
169. Comunicado del Comiti ClandestinoRevolucionario Indigena-ComandanciaGeneraldel
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nactional, (Communication from the EZLN) June 10, 1994,
reprintedin EL FINANCIERO, June 12, 1994, at 22 (translation by the author).
170. Parajes means a spot or area. THE CONCISE AMERICAN HERITAGE SPANISH DICTIONARY 209 (1989).
171. Rechaza el EZLN las Propuestasdel Gobierno, EL FINANCIERO, June 12, 1994, at 22.
Comunicado del Comit Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena-Comandancia General del
Ejircito Zapatistade Liberaci6n Nacional, M6xico, 10 de Junio de 1994.
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form of nation in which indigenous peoples are taken into account." The
caciques and ranchers in Chiapas demanded
that the government expel the
73
squatters who invaded their lands.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE MEXICAN ARMY IN CHIAPAS
Mexico has a reputation for respecting human rights that is less than
enviable. Mexico's reputation as a violator of human rights is not of recent
origin. To the contrary, this negative fame may be traced back a few
decades. 74 In recent years, a substantial increase in human rights violations
has been attracting the growing attention of Mexican and international entities
alike who are concerned with this alarming state of affairs.
Just during the last decade, a considerable number of journalists from
both countries,7" governmental agencies from Mexico'76 and the United
States,'" international organizations (i.e. the Organization of American

172. Id.
173. Augusta Dwyer, Land Fever: Peasant Takeovers of Farmland Have Chiapas Ranchers
Fuming, EL FINANCIERO (Int. ed.), June 27, 1994-July 3, 1994, at 16.
174. Probably the most infamous incident associated with this type of violation was the
massacre at Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Mexico City on October 2, 1968, and the suspects who
were interrogated at the Army's Campo Militar No. 1. See ELENA PONIATOWSKA, LA NOCHE
DE TLATELOLCO (Editorial Siglo XXI, M6xico, 1978).
175. Tod Robberson (The Washington Post), Patrick J. McDonnell, Juanita Darling and
Marjorie Miller (The Los Angeles Times), Anthony DePalma and Tim Golden (The New York
Times), S. Lynne Walker (The San Diego Union Tribune), David Clark Scott (The Christian
Science Monitor), et al.
In Mexico, Jorge G. Castafieda, Miguel Angel Granados Chapa, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser,
Rodolfo F. Pefia, Guillermo Correa, Salvador Corro, Julio Cdsar L6pez, Elena Gallegos,
Antonio Quevedo, Judith Calder6n, Rosa Rojas, Pascual Salanueva, Sergio Aguayo, Rodolfo
Stavenhagen, Mariclaire Acosta, etc., write regularly on human rights violations in LA
JORNADA, UNO MAS UNO, EL FINANCIERO, the weekly PROCESO, etc. For an excellent compilation of 85 newspaper and weekly's articles on the Chiapas insurrection, see THE UPRISING IN
CHIAPAS, supra note 60.
176. In the late 1980s, some State governments started creating official structures in Mexico
for the protection of human rights. This proliferation of protective agencies culminated in the
creation of the Comisi6n Nacional de Derechos Humanos, by President Salinas de Gortari in
1990. See, e.g., the reports of Direcci6npara la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (created
in 1979); Procuradurtapara la Defensa del Indigena(1986); ProcuradurtaSocialde la Montafia
(1987); Procuradurtade Protecci6nCiudadana(1988); Direcci6n Generalde Derechos Humanos
de la Secretarfa de Gobernaci6n (1989); Procuradurfasde Pobres de San Luis Potost (1989);
Comisi6n de Derechos Humanos (1989); Comisi6n Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Mexico
City, 1990). JORGE CARPIZO, DERECHAS HUMANOS Y OMBUDSMAN 11-14 (1993).
177. The U.S. Department of State systematically monitors human rights developments in
Mexico in general, as well as when they involve U.S. citizens. A "90-day report" submitted to
the U.S. Congress, for example, states: "During the last reporting quarter the Embassy and our
Consulates in Mexico have received notice of twenty-two crimes of violence against American
citizens .... The Embassy is also concerned with an increasing number of reports from many
parts of the country of serious abuse of authority by persons wearing the uniforms and claiming
to be members of the Federal Judicial Police." THE 19TH 90-DAY REPORT OF MExICO, Current
Developments in Mexico. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations,and on Western HemisphereAffairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990) [hereinafter
Current Developments]. The general situation of human rights in that country is also reported
annually in the State Department's "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices."
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States and the International Red Cross) and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) from Mexico and the United States, have made statements, sent
delegations to conduct direct investigations, or published reports alleging the
systematic commission of human rights violation throughout the Republic of
Mexico.
The overall impression to be deduced from the most recent reports on
human rights violations in Mexico published by both official' 78 and NGO's
from Mexico' 79 and the United States,"8 is that torture and extrajudicial
killings by police and security forces, and rural violence are pervasive
problems. Such actions were also committed by the Mexican Army in
Chiapas. The unprecedented violence displayed by the Mexican Army to
repress the Chiapas uprising, especially during the first ten days of the
conflict, generated an immediate and growing concern among human rights
activists both in Mexico and the United States.''
From a military viewpoint, the unexpected Chiapas rebellion represented
not only an embarrassment for the Mexican Army and the government of
President Salinas, but also a failure of its intelligence apparatus. 1n2 As
noted earlier, the Secretary of the Interior'83 and the Governor of the State
of Chiapas, were included among its very first casualties. Because of its
stunning New Year's Day offensive, which allowed the peasant army to
control four towns for twenty-four hours, an overhaul in the Mexican Army's
The U.S. Congress, through its Subcommittee on Human Rights and International
Organizations, and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, conducts periodic hearings on human rights
questions in Mexico.
178. The official reports are: 1) North American Free TradeAgreement-Mexico's Politicaland
Legal Environmentfor Doing Business: Hearing Before the Committee on Small Business, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); 2) Speech of Jorge Madrazo Cullar, President of the CNDH, at an
official ceremony to present the Commission's annual report (May 1993-May 1994) at the
presidential residence of "Los Pinos" in Mexico City on June 6, 1994; and 3) Comision
Nacional de Derechos Humanos, INFORME ANUAL, Mayo 1993-Mayo 1994, Mexico, D.F.,
Junio de 1994.
179. For a discussion on human rights in Mexico during the administration of President
Salinas, see Mariclaire Acosta, Los Derechos Humanos en M0xico: Balance Sexenal, EL
NACIONAL (Suplemento Especial), June 12, 1994, at vi-viii.
180. The reports from the U.S. non-governmental organizations are: (A) AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA, CurrentDevelopments, supra note 177, at 31 (statement of Rona Weitz, Deputy
Director, Washington Office); (B) MEXICO: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION IN MEXICO
CONFIRMS REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING CHIAPAS UPRISING. (Al Index:
AMR 41/WU) March 1994; (C) HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, VI(3) MEXICO. THE NEW
YEAR'S REBELLION: Violations of Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw during the Armed Revolt
in Chiapas, Mexico (March 1, 1994); (D) MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, No
DOUBLE STANDARD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: Linkage of NAFTA with Hemispheric System of
Human Rights (Dec. 1992); (E) AMERICAS WATCH, UNCEASING ABUSES. Human Rights in
Mexico One Year After the Introduction of Reform (Sept. 1991); and (F) A POLICY OF IMPUNITY,
supra note 151.
181. For an account on the Mexican Army and the military theater of operations, see
Robberson, supra note 14; Tim Golden, Mexican Army is Said to Abuse Rebel Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1994, at Al; and Juanita Darling, Mexican Army Under Fire From Two Sides,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at A10.
182. See Robberson, supra note 14, at A-21.
183. See Robberson, supra note 70, at A-13.
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military command, and its mission, has been forecast.' 14 It is expected that
the Army will withdraw from its traditional roles of fighting drug traffickers
and providing welfare services and concentrate, instead, on counterinsurgency activities. 'I
As soon as the Mexican Army moved into the zone initially controlled
by the rebels, including the towns of Morelia, Las Margaritas, El Corralito,
Rancho del Carmen de Maria, Altamirano, Ocosingo and, in particular, the
city of San Crist6bal de las Casas, "a growing chorus of accusations of
torture, beatings and illegal arrests,"" allegedly committed by the Army,
were made by relatives of the victims, priests, peasants, civilians, and human
rights organizations.
The Mexican Army violated a number of Mexican laws as well as
international law conventions to which Mexico is a party, during the Chiapas
rebellion. The evidence of these violations derives from journalistic reports
from Mexico and the U.S., NGO reports, and the official reports of
Mexico's National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH).
A most detailed report in Proceso, published on February 7, 1994, lists
nine different types of criminal and/or human rights offenses committed by
"elements of the Mexican Army" during the first weeks of the Chiapas
conflict."7 Most of the allegations made by Proceso have been backed up
by the other sources, including the official CNDH.18 8 However, some of
the human rights and criminal law incidents reported in Proceso, and in
certain NGO's publications, for example, were not reported in any of the
CNDH's 1994, official reports.
Based upon the consulted reports, the violations of the Mexican Army
committed against Mexican nationals, and in particular against indigenous
peoples in Chiapas, appear to be numerous and diverse. Rather than

184. See Robberson, supra note 14, at A-21.
185. Id.
186. Golden, supra note 181, at Al.
187. See Correa et al., supra note 18 and the corresponding text. The human rights violations
of the Army are summarized by PRoCEsO as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Direct bombing of civilian towns and villages;
Illegal detention of persons;
Outright arbitrary searches and seizures of private house dwellings;
Abuses of authority;
Intimidation and threats, both to individual persons and to communities;
Torture;
Forced and involuntary disappearance of persons;

8.
9.

Homicide of civilians; and
Summary execution of civilians.

Correa et al., supra note 18, at 6.
188. See Comisi6n Nacional de Derechos Humanos, INFORME ANUAL: Mayo 1993-Mayo
1994, 620-47 (1994) [hereinafter INFORME ANUAL]. This annual report expanded upon the
CNDH's Special Report to the Public Opinion on the Activities and Considerationsof the CNDH

in the Case of the Highlandsand the Jungle of Chiapas, Gaceta 44, CNDH, Ciudad de Mexico,
Matzo 1994 at 17-23 (translation by the author) [hereinafter Special Report].
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engaging in a detailed examination of each of the numerous violations
allegedly committed by the Mexican Army during the Chiapas conflict, this
section only addresses what may be characterized as the most egregious
violations. These violations received special attention in the 1994 Annual
Report of the National Commission
and were discussed under the title:
1 89
"Especially Important Cases."
In its 1994 Annual Report, the CNDH reported 274 human rights
violations affecting 889 persons (most of them indigenous peoples)."9 Out
of this total, the Mexican Army is by far the worst offender with eighty-nine
complaints, followed by thirty-one against the EZLN, twelve against Mayors
of Chiapas' towns, and four against Mexico's Attorney General's Office.19
Of the 274 total violations, the following 154 attract immediate attention
because of the egregiousness of the crimes: seventy-six cases of torture,
sixty-four homicides, ten cases involving illegal deprivation of freedom,"9
and four aerial attacks.193
The violations committed by elements of the Mexican Army and by
certain public authorities may be divided into the following two large
categories: a) specific violations of constitutional rights; and, b) violations of
specific statutes and codes, in particular the Federal Act to Prevent and
Sanction Torture and the Penal Code of the State of Chiapas.'"9
A. Specific Violations to ConstitutionalRights
Chapter I of the Mexican Constitution contains an explicit enumeration
of constitutional rights. The listing of these "garantfas individuales," ranges
from freedom from slavery, the right to a free education and legal equality
for men and women, to freedom of ideas, freedom from censorship, the right
of peaceful assembly, the right to have arms at home, and the right to travel
throughout the territory of Mexico without the need of a security card,

189. Programa Permanente de la CNDH en los Altos y Selva de Chiapas, Section 9: "Casos
Especialmente Importantes radicados en la Coordinaci6n General para los Altos y Selva de
Chiapas," Id. at 634-47. This section lists eleven "especially important cases" involving alleged
violations committed by (1) elements of the Mexican Army, (2) the Secretariat of National
Defense (Sedena), (3) the Attorney General's Office (PGR), (4) the First Federal District Judge
in Tuxtla Guti6rrez and (5) the Mayor of San Juan Chamula. The CNDH does not explain why
these cases are "especially important." These cases range from summary executions, aerial
attacks and torture to attacks against journalists, burial of victims in illegal massive graves and
violent expulsions of indigenous peoples. Id.
190. For a breakdown of the violations, see app. 1.
191. Id.
192. The CNDH has not provided a distinction between "illegal deprivation of freedom" and
"arbitrary detentions."
193. INFORME ANUAL, supra note 188, at 621-24; see also app. 1. This enumeration does
not include the 29 persons who are still missing, listed under the category of "[d]isappearances,"
initially reported as including 432 individuals by the CNDH.
194. Ordinary criminal offenses will not be addressed in this article. These crimes include,
for example, homicide, theft, abuse of authority, illegal deprivation of freedom, damages to
property, etc.
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passport, safe conduct or other similar requirements. 19
Regarding the Chiapas conflict, special attention should be given to a
number of constitutional rights which appeared to have been violated by
elements of the Mexican Army, as well as by certain government officials.
1. Freedom of Transit and Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Since the beginning of the rebellion, the Mexican Army erected
barricades and military check-points, closing a number of public roads and
highways in the theater of military operations, thus suspending or impeding
the traffic of persons and vehicles. 196
Article 11 of Mexico's Constitution guarantees, as a constitutional right,
the "freedom to travel throughout the territory" of that country without
having to comply with any special transit requirements." The erection of
road blockades and military check-points by the Mexican Army in Chiapas
is in clear violation of this constitutional precept. For example, no civilians
were allowed to enter into the area demarcated by the Mexican Army as the
theater of hostilities. Even travelling near that area, or fleeing from it, led
to prolonged interrogation conducted by elements of the military.
It has also been documented that military elements did not permit
civilians in towns or villages near the theater of military operations to
publicly assemble for any reason, despite the tenor of Article 9 of Mexico's
Constitution. This article provides that "[T]he right to assemble or associate
The
peaceably for any lawful purpose cannot be restricted .. ."198
Mexican Army, as well as municipal, state and federal authorities proceeded
to disperse any groups of people, using violence in most cases, and
subjecting a number of them to prolonged and sometimes brutal interrogations.
These constitutional rights violations should not be taken lightly,
especially when the President decided not to suspend any constitutional rights
The deliberate
in the country as a result of the Chiapas rebellion.'9

195. See CONST. arts. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 (Mex.).
196. The CNDH expressly recognized the existence of problems to the constitutional rights
of transit and assembly. Special Report, supra note 188, at 17.
197. CONST., art. 11 (Mex.).

198. CONST., art. 9 (Mex.).
199. Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution provides that the suspension of constitutional
rights may be ordered by the President of the Republic, "in the case of invasion, grave
disturbance that alters the public peace or any other action placing the society in a situation of
grave danger or conflict." This suspension may be applied nationally, or may be limited to a
specific place, suspending those "constitutional rights that may be an obstacle for confronting
the situation in a rapid and direct manner." However, the suspension should be for a limited
period of time, established through general notices and not restrained to a specific individual.
CONST., art. 29 (Mex.) (translation by the author).
The President of the CNDH asserted that: "[Tihe President of Mexico ordered that the
Mexican Army and the security forces conduct their actions in full compliance with human
rights. And that the Presidency will investigate cases where these orders were not followed."
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decision not to invoke the r6gime of exception provided by Article 29
explicitly recognizes that no violations to constitutional rights were to be
tolerated. Otherwise, the official statement that "Mexico continued to apply
the full panoply of the totality of its constitutional rights," as expressed by
the President of the CNDH, 2 ° is but a myth.
2. Violent Home Intrusions Without Search
Warrants and Aerial Military Attacks
Articles 14 and 16 of Mexico's Constitution, modeled on the Constitution of the United States, protect two of the most precious and fundamental
rights in that country. Article 14 provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, property, possessions, or rights without a trial by a duly created
court in which the essential formalities of procedure are observed and in
conformity with laws enacted prior to the act."2°l
Article 16 establishes:
No one shall be molested in his person, family, domicile, papers, or
possessions except by virtue of a written order of the competent authority
stating the legal grounds and justification for the action taken. No order or
arrest or detention shall be issued against any person other than the
competent judicial authority .... The authority that implements a judicial
order of apprehension should place the accused under the judge's authority,
without delay and under his utmost strict responsibility. The contravention
of this provision shall be sanctioned by penal law ... No accused person
shall be held by the Ministerio Ptblico (i.e. Public Prosecutor) longer than
48 hours, within which period of time the accused must be freed or be
placed under the competent judicial authority ....
Any abuse ... shall be
sanctioned by the [applicable] penal law.2
During the initial days of the Chiapas rebellion elements of the Mexican
Army and other public authorities violently intruded into private homes, not
only breaking and destroying possessions and assets but stealing money,
objects and other belongings2 3 without any "written order" of any "competent authority," in blatant violation of the Mexican Constitution.
In addition, the Mexican Army conducted sweeps in many cities, towns,
villages and hamlets which resulted in massive arrests,' without the
Special Report, supra note 188, at 18.

200. Id.
201. CONST., art. 14 (Mex.) (translation by the author).

202. CONST., art. 16 (Mex.) (translation by the author).
203. In its Annual Report 1994, the CNDH officially acknowledges it received 274 complaints
to human rights violations affecting 889 persons. The Commission reports 57 arbitrary

detentions, 54 cases of injuries, 42 of abuse of authority, 13 of theft, 10 of damage to property
and 2 illegal entry into homes, among other violations. See app. 1; INFORME ANUAL, supra note

188, at 621-624.

204. MExIco: THE NEw YEAR'S

REBELLION,

supra note 180, at 11.
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proper orders of detention or arrest being issued by competent judicial
authorities.' Tim Golden reported such a sweep: "the troops surrounded
their neighborhood and began searching house to house [in the town of
Oxchuc]. Alicia L6pez, a 28-year old woman with four children, said that
her father, Feliciano, 50, and her brother Eliseo, 27, were hauled away as
the soldiers rifled through the family's dirt-floor shack and that she had not
seen or heardfrom them since."' Golden also noted: "three men were
taken away with thirty-six others who were arrested here that day ... and
have not been seen since. .. . Soldiers have been accused of detaining
suspected guerrillas without due process, beating or torturing them and
threateningtheir lives. At least a handful of people captured by the Army are
also said to have disappeared."'
The violence and arbitrariness of these actions moved Human Rights
Watch/Americas to write in a recent report:
Most of the Army sweeps, some of which were conducted in conjunction
with officers of the PGR (i.e. Procuraduria General de la Rep-iblica, or
Mexico's District Attorney's Office) resulted in arbitrary arrests in
violation of international human rights norms. Many villagers were taken
from their homes without warrants or apparentprobable cause to believe
that they were involved in the fighting . . . [T]he CNDH reported that
it had established that 131 persons had been arrested. . . . The CNDH
figures were based on court reports; they did not include persons arrested

by the army who either were released or were never turned over to civilian
authorities 208

In its 1994 Annual Report, the CNDH acknowledged that 149 persons
were detained by the PGR or by the State's Attorney General's Office.2'9
Out of this number, forty-one were criminally charged with federal offenses,
and forty-two with ordinary crimes. Of the forty-one charged with federal
crimes, only five remain in detention. The remaining thirty-six have been
freed, including one who was a minor, two who were found "unimputable,"
two more who were put out of detention because "there were no sufficient
elements to legally charge them," fifteen who were freed on bail and sixteen
whose criminal proceedings were "dismissed" based on a recommendation
of the CNDH. 10
As the official report of the CNDH implies, most of the charges

205. The CNDH reported 461 disappearances, 57 arbitrary detentions, 37 cases of threats and
intimidation, 10 of illegal deprivation of freedom and 2 kidnappings, among other violations.
See App. 1; INFORME ANUAL, supra note 188, at 621-24.
206. Golden, supra note 181, at A7.
207. Id. at Al, A7.
208. MExico: THE NEW YEAR'S REBELLION, supra note 180, at 11 (emphasis added). For
a detailed account of these abusive practices, see Section V: "Disappearances, Arbitrary Arrest
and Detention, Torture, and Cruel Treatment in Detention".
209. INFORME ANUAL, supra note 188, at 625-26.
210. Id. at 626.
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formulated by the federal prosecutor were legally unfounded. In the case of
sixteen indigenous persons who had been accused of a number of "federal
crimes," the charges were so unjust that the CNDH felt obligated to produce
a recommendation to the Attorney General himself to free them.2 '
It remains to be seen whether the federal prosecutors who criminally
charged these 16 indigenous persons will be investigated for false incrimination or whether any of these indigenous persons will be financially compensated by the Mexican government for having been wrongly detained, accused
and jailed. It is also unclear whether any members of the Mexican Army
will be investigated for violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The military violated Article 14 by conducting aerial military attacks on
civilian towns and villages and thus arbitrarily depriving people of life,
property and possessions. Tod Robberson, of The Washington Post,
reported:
[A] diplomat [in San Crist6bal de las Casas] said at least seven civilians
were killed by the military Wednesday outside Rancho del Carmen de
Maria while fleeing a group of guerrillas that had entered the village, about
20 miles southeast of San Cristobal. The diplomat said that according to his
interviews with relatives of the dead civilians, Zapatistas had passed
through the village while attempting to flee into heavily wooded mountains
ahead of an advancing Army patrol. Frightenedby the guerrillas'presence,
the villagersfled down a mountain path, where a military aircraftswooped
down and strafed them, killing seven.
B. Violations of the Federal Statute on Torture
In Mexico, the use of torture and extra-judicial killings have been wellknown and well-documented for several decades.2 3 While these acts have
taken place in connection with political elections and with the violence that
land disputes provoke in rural areas, torture and extrajudicial killings have
been more clearly identified and associated more regularly with cases
involving routine law enforcement practices and, in recent years, drug-related
cases 214
Members of the Federal Judicial Police,2 5 the State Judicial Police, the
so-called "Madrinas," and elements of the Mexican armed forces are the

211. Id.
212. Tod Robberson, Non-Indians Lead Mexico's Uprising, Says President Salinasas Rebels
Flee, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1994, at A-12 (emphasis added). See also text accompanying supra
note 18.
213. A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note 151.
214. Id. See also the statements made by the representatives of Amnesty International,
Minnesota Lawyers' Human Rights Committee and the U.S. Department of State. CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 177, at 3.
215. For an official opinion on the "mistreatment of detainees by Mexican police, particularly
the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, or MFJP," see the testimony of Sally G. Cowal, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
Current Developments, supra note 177, at (vi).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss1/2

34

Vargas: NAFTA,
the CHIAPAS
Chiapas Rebellion,
and the
Emergence
Mexican LAW
Ethnic
MEXICANof ETHNIC
AND
REBELLION,
NAFTA,
1994]

35

official actors who have been persistently associated with the commission of
these acts. Torture has been so widespread in Mexico that it has been
characterized as "endemic," 2 6 "systematic" and "chronic"" 7 by different
entities on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.
According to Amnesty International, methods of torture range
from beatings to electric shocks to submerging the victim's head in water
until near-suffocation occurs. A widespread and unique method of torture
involves the introduction of mineral water laced with hot chili peppers into
the nasal passages of the victim. The placement of plastic bags over the
victim's head to the point of near-asphyxiation is another commonly
employed form of torture. Rape and sexual abuse have also been reported.
Detainees have also reported being blindfolded, stripped, and bound by the
hands and feet and then tied to wooden planks... . Pregnant women have
reported being beaten in the stomach. . . . Psychological torture is also
common and takes the form of death threats and mock executions. These
methods of torture are widely employed and are considered particularly
of law enforcement agents as they leave no discernible
effective in the eyes
physical marks. 1 s

It was not until 1992, that the administration of President Salinas decided
to enact a federal statute to prevent and punish torture, 1 9 with the evident
purpose of curbing, and hopefully eliminating altogether, this pervasive
practice. Article 3 of this new statute defines the crime of torture as
committed by a public servant who, taking advantage of his/her official
duties, inflicts pain or grave sufferings, whether physical or mental, to a
person, with the purpose of obtaining. .. information or a confession, or
or to force [that person] to
to punish that person for an act committed .
act, or not act, in a certain way .... 220

Article 4 imposes a sanction of imprisonment ranging from three to twelve
years, a fine between 200 and 500 days of minimum salary and denies access
to public employment for twice as long as the term imposed by the
convicting sentence."
The statute provides, in Article 6, that the claim that there are "exceptional situations such as internal political stability, urgency in the investiga216. A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note 151, at 9. "Torture and ill treatment are prevalent
throughout Mexico. Most branches of the security forces at both the federal and state levels have
been implicated. Torture is also practiced by the Intelligence Directorate, and to a lesser extent,
by the municipal police and the armed forces." Current Developments, supra note 177
(Statement of Rona Weitz, Deputy Director, Washington Office, Amnesty International, USA).
217. Current Developments, supra note 177, at 87 (statement of Daniel Gerdts of the
Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee).
218. Current Developments, supra note 177, at 38.
219. Ley Federalpara Prevenir y Sancionar la Tortura (i.e. Federal Act to Prevent and
Sanction Torture), D.O. of December 27, 1991, amended by decree of D.O. of July 2, 1992
reprinted in LEGISLACI6N SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS 87 (1993) [hereinafter LEGISLACI6N].

220. Id. at 88. (translation and emphasis by the author).
221. Id.
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tions or any other circumstance," are not exculpatory grounds for liability for
commission of the crime of torture.'
Furthermore, Article 10 provides
that a person responsible for the commission of torture "is obligated to cover
the expenses of legal counselling, medical doctors, funeral, rehabilitation or
expenses of any other kind, incurred by the victim or his/her relatives, as a
consequence of the crime. In addition, [the perpetrator] is obligated to repair
the damage and to indemnify for the prejudices caused to the victim, or
his/her economic dependents," in cases involving "loss of life; adverse health
changes; loss of freedom; loss of economic income; labor incapacity; loss of
property or property damage, and adverse impact on reputation. "2
The
final paragraph of this article establishes that "the State is jointly responsible
[with the convicted perpetrator] for the reparation of the damage. "I
Probably the most recent and detailed description of the Army's torturing
methods was made by the weekly Mexico City publication Proceso:
"[T]orturing methods utilized by the Mexican soldiers included electric
shocks to the testicles, hoods loaded with hot chili powder to asphyxiate the
victim, burns inflicted with a lighter, skin cuts with knives and insertion of
pins under the fingernails. "I
Tim Golden, from The New York Times,
reported that
[O]n the morning of January 7.... hundreds of soldiers swept through the
modest shacks of the 183 families that live here [in Morelia], rounded up
the men and forced them to lie face down on the local basketball court with
their hands behind their heads. While one soldier shouted that the town belonged to the rebel EZLN . . . other troops took three men to the office
adjoining the adobe church and tortured them, twisting their arms and
dunking their heads into a pail of liquid.226
Amnesty International also reported on the military's torturing of
indigenous people. Morris Tidball-Binz, an investigator for Amnesty
International, after interviewing some of the seventy suspected rebels held in
the state prison, said: "The great majority of those jailed appear to have
suffered torture. . . . These people do not need an amnesty ....
They need
access to proper trials, and most of them would be released. "I
In the section devoted to "especially important cases," the CNDH
reports at least six tragic incidents involving torture and extra-judicial killings

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 89.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
PROCESO, supra note 18, at 6 (translation by the author).
Golden, supra note 181, at Al.

227. Id. (emphasis added). Gabriel Guerra Castellanos, a spokesman for President Salinas,
declined to comment on various reports of abuses by the Army when asked by The New York
Times reporter during his visit to Morelia, Chiapas. Id.
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resulting in the deaths of thirty-six indigenous persons. 22
Despite the mounting evidence asserting the direct involvement of
members of the Mexican Army in the commission of such violence, official
agencies of the government of Mexico, such as the PGR 29 and the
CNDH 2 0 have systematically denied any participation by elements of the
Mexican Army.
It has become evident that in politically sensitive cases (those affecting
the President of Mexico, the PGR or the Mexican Army) the CNDH has
shown political timidity to even suggest, let alone formally advance, charges
against any powerful political entities in Mexico.2 31
Since President Salinas created the CNDH in 1990, and appointed its
head, it is not surprising that the CNDH deferred to President Salinas. This
self-imposed political limitation compromises the impartiality, objectivity and
autonomy of the CNDH. 23
IV. RESPECT FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN MEXICO

A. The Colonial Period
Indigenous peoples in Mexico have been subjected to a system of
subjugation and oppression since 1521, when the Spanish destroyed Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Aztec empire. Reports of the atrocities committed by
the Spanish army are numerous and well documented, starting with the vivid
descriptions written by Bernal Dfaz del Castillo, a soldier-reporter and

228. INFORME ANUAL, supra note 188, at 634-647; see also app. 1. Given the peculiar way
of drafting utilized by the CNDH to report these incidents, it is impossible differentiate between
torture and summary execution cases. Most probably, the cases reported involved the
commission of both crimes, although this is not officially acknowledged by the CNDH.
229. Regarding the executions of "at least five persons following a battle in Ocosingo.
Between five and eleven persons were displayed after the battle. Each had his hands tied behind
his back and a bullet through the head. [The Mexican Attorney General's Office quickly
'cleared' the military of any wrongdoing, but widespread criticism of the cover-up prompted the
Army to begin its own investigation." Petition for Interim and Permanent Measures regarding
the Systematic Violation of the American Convention on Human Rights and Other International
Covenants in Chiapas, Mexico. January 1, 1994 to the Present 12 (Feb. 10, 1994).
230. The CNDH, in its 1994 Annual Report, reached the conclusion that the killings of the
five persons executed in Ocosingo's municipal market "were the product of maneuvers of
summary execution," the CNDH added that "[T]he PGR informed that no element of the
Mexican Army had any involvement in said incidents," since in accordance with the PGR's
investigations, "at the time of the death of these five persons the [military] actions were taking
place outside the town of Ocosingo." Id. at 635.
231. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS, MEXICO:
WAITING FOR JUSTICE IN CHIAPAS 116 (1994).
232. Id.
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historian who accompanied Herndn Cortez in the conquest of Mexico. 3
From the victims' perspective, the works of the Mexica reporters, or
Icnocuicatl, constitute the oldest testimony to provide a unique insight into
the spiritual and religious reactions which the destruction and leveling of
their beautiful city, and its inhabitants, produced at the time.'
During the colonial period (1521-1821), the oppression and exploitation
of indigenous peoples was placed at the center of the economic and political
system. The prevailing belief at the time was of the inferiority of the Indians,
who were conceived as having, in the words of a religious writer of the
epoch, "an inalienable right to be slaves." 23 5 From a legal and philosophical viewpoint, two schools of thought remained constant during this colonial
period: those who advanced the most extreme views against the indigenous
peoples, represented by Gin6s de Sepfilveda, Sol6rzano Pereira and Tons
Ortiz, among others 36 The central thesis of these authors is reflected by
the ideas of Sol6rzano, who wrote:
God ... wanted the Indians to be subjugated by the Spaniards and to be
deprived of their kingdoms because of their numerous sins. . . . [T]he
Indians, because of their lack of intelligence, have to be subjected to the
Spaniards as provided by the Law of Nature, the Spaniards being the ones
who will elevate them to a life of rationality .... M
The other school strongly defended the Indians, in the eloquent voices
of Francisco de Vitoria, Antonio de Montesinos and, especially, Fray
Bartolom6 de las Casas, who advocated that
[T]he Indians, as creatures of God, share in all human attributes ...
having been endowed with intelligence. Because of this they are capable of
having religious thoughts, virtues, and the right to live as free persons
within a civil society and to own properties, to have laws and a legitimate
government as they have practically proven even before the arrival of the
Spaniards.23a

The Spanish government did not adopt a definite policy on this matter.
233. Bemal Diaz is famous for his Historia Verdadera de La Conquista de la Nueva Espaha

(The True History of the Conquest of the New Spain), written in 1568 and published in 1632.

Simply written, this book is an eyewitness account of the invasion and conquest of Mexico
narrated from a soldier's personal viewpoint.
234. See VIsi6N DE LOS VENCIDOS. RELACIONES INDIGENAS DE LA CONQUISTA (Vision of the

Vanquished. Indian Relations of the Conquest). Translated from the Ndhuatl by Angel Maria
Garibay and edited by Miguel Le6n-Portilla. Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico, 1984.
235. See Guillermo Floris Margadant, Official Mexican Attitudes Toward the Indians: An
HistoricalEssay, 54 TULANE L. REv. 964 (1980).
236. For a review of the ideas advanced by these authors, see Rodolfo Stavenhagen, De C6mo
Subyugara los Naturales, in DERECHO INDIGENA Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN AMtRuCA LATINA

13-22 (1988) (How to Subjugate the Naturals: Indigenous Law and Human Rights in Latin
America) [hereinafter DERECHO INDfGENA].
237. Id. at 16. (translation by author)
238. Id. at 17-18 (translation by the author).
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Instead, its position fluctuated between these two extreme viewpoints,
favoring one or the other, as dictated by its own practical interests. 239
According to Silvio Zavala, when Alexander Von Humboldt visited New
Spain at the end of the colonial period, he discovered that the Indians
constituted "a separate nation, privileged by law but humiliated by everyone,
with no communication with Spaniards or mestizos because of the laws."I
However, the misery and abandonment of indigenous peoples that prevailed
in colonial Mexico for three centuries would become radically altered, at
least in theory, when Mexico acquired its independence in 1821.
B. The Independence
As a new republic, Mexico, inspired by the political and legal system of
the United States, and by the ideas of the French encyclopedists, promptly
enacted legislation which introduced the unprecedented notion of legal
equality designed to embrace all the new citizens of Mexico, whether they
were criollos,2" 1 mestizos, Africans, or Indians.f 2 However, this notion
was nothing more than a legal fiction.243
The new notion of "legal equality" very soon started to produce negative
consequences for most indigenous peoples who started rapidly losing their
communal lands. Moreover, it has been suggested that this legal fiction was
designed simply to serve as a tool to consolidate the political and economic
power of the criollos. It has been advanced, for instance, that even those
heroes who fought for Mexico to gain its independence already had in mind
a system which was going to be created, and ruled, only by criollos, thus
designed to impose the criollo predominance over the indigenous peoples.' Nahmad claims that the indigenous peoples were left unprotected
since the enforcement of equality granted them by the law was left in the
hands of the criollosAS
Concerned about this dichotomy, Tadeo Ortiz, an eminent humanist,
wrote in 1822:

239. Id. at 17.
240. Id.
241. Criollos means native. THE CONCISE AMERICAN HERITAGE SPANISH DICTIONARY 74
(1989).
242. Prof. Margadant asserts that "[Flrom 1821 to 1910, after Independence but before the
Mexican Revolution, the Indian was officially considered a citizen equal to all other in the
eyes of the law ... This egalitarian philosophy, however, did not guarantee the Indian a
comfortable role in Mexican society, for the Indian remains politically and economically
vulnerable." See supra note 235, at 964-65 (emphasis added).
243. See Salom6n Nahmad, Indigenismo Oficial y Luchas Indigenas en Mk.ico, (Official
Indian Policy and Indian Struggles in Mexico), in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236.
244. To support this assertion, Salom6n Nahmad cites an 1811 decree issued by Jos6 Maria
Morelos, in which "the most radical of Mexico's independence leaders" wrote: "that our system
is only leading to the notion that the political and military government which resides in the
Europeans, changes to the criollos..." Id. at 301.
245. Id.
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I confess that I see no difference between the condition of the black slave
[in the United States] and that of the Indians in our haciendas. The slavery
of the first one is caused by the barbaric right of the strongest, whereas the
slavery of the Indians is caused by fraud, the malice of landowners and the
innocence of human beings almost incapable of free thinking ....
And it
is amazing that the Indian population of New Spain has lost, instead of
of Independence, changing real privileges for
gaining, in the 24Revolution
6
abstract rights.
The legal equality granted to indigenous peoples in Mexico at the time
of its independence did not help improve the well-being of those authoctonous groups economically, politically, culturally or legally. Philosophically, the granting of that legal equality may represent a progressive development in the legal system of the epoch, especially if compared with the
meager rights the colonial system recognized in favor of the Indians.
However, that legal equality turned out to be more symbolic, or aspirational,
than practical, thus affirming the premise that the "legal solution" contained
in the law books by no means corresponded to historic reality. 7
The enactment of the Nationalization Act of 1856, to nationalize vast
extensions of idle lands, produced catastrophic consequences among Indian
communities. It appears that the process of "privatization" of these lands,
rather than distributing the lands to individual owners, contributed to
consolidate the Mexican latifundio in rural areas. The acts of arbitrary
dispossession and other injustices committed on the Indians by criollos and
mestizos as a result of these enactments triggered numerous violent Indian
revolts in different parts of the country, especially in Chihuahua and Chiapas.
In turn, these rebellions led the government to enact further legislation in
order to pacify those "barbaric Indians" by the violent use of military
force. 2 s
C. The Revolution and the 1917 Constitution
In theory, the Revolution of 1910 embraced the goals and aspirations
advanced by the indigenous peoples of Mexico. In his Plan de San Luis
Potosf, 9 which formally marked the initiation of the Revolution, Francisco
I. Madero acknowledged that due to abuse of the law, "numerous small
owners, most of them Indians, have been disposed of their lands, either by
246. Id. at 302.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The Plan of San Luis Potosi was issued on October 5, 1910. It contained eleven sections,
proposing, inter alia: (1) That the Federal Constitution of 1857, and the principle of "Effective
suffrage, no reelection," be declared the "Supreme law of the Republic"; (2) No recognition of
President Porfirio Diaz' government; (3) Francisco I. Madero assumes the Executive Power of
Mexico, as "Provisional President"; (4) That on November 20, 1910, all Mexicans "take the
arms to expel out of power the current governing authorities." For the text of this proclamation,
see FELIPE TENA RAMIREZ. LEYEs FUNDAMENTALES DE MEXICO, 1808-1991 732-39 (Ed.
Porria, 16th ed., Mdxico, 1991) [hereinafter LEYES FUNDAMENTALES].
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means of resolutions issued by the Ministry of Development, or by
judgments rendered by the courts of the Republic. "'
Another proclamation that advanced a rural program to favor indigenous
groups was the Plan de Ayala,"' enacted by Emiliano Zapata in the state
of Morelos on November 28, 1911. Claiming that "the immense majority
of peoples and Mexican citizens" have no land of their own, Zapata declared
the right to "expropriate these lands, hills and waters ... through proper
indemnification to their powerful owners . . . so the peoples and citizens of
Mexico can obtain ejidos, colonies, public lands for villages or [lands] for
agricultural work . . . thus improving the prosperity and well-being of the
Mexicans. "I2
Section 6 of this Plan may have inspired the leaders of the EZLN to
trigger their armed rebellion in Chiapas. This section reads:
SIXTH. - As an additional part of this Plan, we submit: that the lands, hills

and waters usurped by the hacendados, cientificos23 or caciques under

the shade of tyranny and venal justice, will be given immediate possession
over these immovable assets to the villages or citizens having the
corresponding titles over these properties, from which they have been
disposssessed in bad faith by our oppressors, maintaining in all instances,
with the arms in our hands, the said possession, and the usurpers claiming
to have a right over said properties will receive a judgment from
the
2
special courts to be established at the triumph of the Revolution. 54
Mexico's Constitution of 1917, its first one of this century, must be
included among the most important consequences generated by the Revolution. 255 However, most demands advanced by indigenous peoples were not
specifically addressed in the new legal instrument but were included in a
general and oblique manner. For instance, the right to possess land as a
personal patrimony to be used for agricultural purposes, which most
authoctonous groups had systematically advanced since colonial times, found
only a brief and indirect reference in Article 27 of the Constitution. 6

250. Id. at 736.
251. This Plan was formed by 15 sections. Basically, it was issued against the government
of Madero and the proposals contained in the Plan de San Luis. For the text of Plan de Ayala,
see LEYES FUNDAMENTALES, id. at 740-43.
252. Section 7, Plan de Ayala, id. at 742.
253. The term cientfficos (scientists) was used to refer to a very small circle of official
advisors to President Porfirio Dfaz, that gained notoriety during the Diaz dictatorship. In
general, the cientfficos were very wealthy aristocrats, members of the cabinet, most of whom
educated in France. LESLEY BYRD SIMPSON, MANY MEXICOs 261 (1952).
254. Section 6, LEYES FUNDAMENTALES, supra note 249, at 742.
255. Mexico's Federal Constitution, composed of 136 articles, was promulgated on February
5, 1917. The Constitution was produced by a Constitutional Congress (i.e. Congreso
Constituyente) held in the city of Quer6taro in late 1916 and early 1917. The Constitutional
Congress started its work by discussing a Constitutional draft produced by President Venustiano
Carranza. Amended some 365 times, the 1917 Constitution continues to be in force today. On
this matter, see JORGE CARPIZO, LA CONSTITUCION MEXICANA DE 1917 (1980).
256. Id.
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Thus, instead of distributing the land to individual land owners, this Article
granted "communal lands to rural communities" in order to constitute
collective ejidos. Yet, this Constitution did not even mention the words

"Indian" or "indigenous peoples," or any similar reference to convey the
idea that Mexico is composed of a variety of authoctonous ethnic groups.
Although the 1917 Constitution included the notion of "social
rights," 7 it did not embrace indigenous peoples, as an ethnic minority

group, within this notion. The Mexican Constitution paid no attention to the
territory occupied for centuries by the different indigenous peoples when it
recognized the geographical boundaries of the twenty-nine States and two
Territories referred to by Article 43 of President Carranza's Constitutional

Draft. 5 Recently, anthropologists in Mexico have pointed out that "there
is no State in Mexico whose formation responds to a criterion of ethnic

identity of some indigenous group."259 As a practical consequence, indigenous peoples in Mexico have no political representation or in the Federal
Congress, and almost none in the State legislatures.m
In sum, Mexico's Constitution of 1917 virtually ignored the existence of
indigenous peoples, their rights and their needs, both as individuals and as
a social group. In light of other constitutions in Latin America, in particular
those of Argentina of 1819, 21 Guatemala of 1985,2 Nicaragua of

257. "Social rights" are those constitutionally recognized in favor of certain specific groups,
such as laborers and campesinos, and more recently, consumers. This explicit recognition by the
State has led to the conception of Mexican law as divided into three large branches: the
traditional Public and Private law, widely recognized within the civil legal tradition, the
emerging branch of "Social Law," formed by Labor law and Consumer protection law and, in
recent years, Environmental law. Id. at 154-62. Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution
represents the paradigm of said "Social rights." Id.
258. For the text of this article, see LEYEs FUNDAMENTALES, supra note 249, at 775.
259. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 304 (translation by the author).
260. Id.
261. Article 28 of the Argentinean Constitution of 1819 provides:
[T]he Indians, being equal in dignity and rights to the other citizens, shall enjoy the
same privileges and shall be governed by the same laws. . . . The legislative body
shall efficiently promote the well-being of the naturals through laws that will improve
their condition until they are at the same level of the other classes of the State.
reprintedin Luiz Diaz Miller & Tania Carrasco, El Derecho Indfgina, in DERECHO INDIGENA,
supra note 236, at 48 (translation by the author).
262. The new Guatemalan Constitution of May 31, 1985, provides in its Article 66:
Protection to Ethic Groups: Guatemala is formed by different ethnic groups, among
them the indigenous groups of a Mayan origin. The State recognizes, respects and
promotes their way of living, customs, traditions, forms of social organization, the
use of indigenous costumes in men and women, languages and dialects.
This Constitution devotes Section 11, Chapter II, Title I to "Indigenous Communities. "Reprinted
in id. at 56 (translation by the author).
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1979,1 3 Panama of 1972,' and Paraguay of 1967,' which explicitly
recognize the existence and the special rights of indigenous groups, failure
to include such a provision in the Constitution of Mexico, the country in this
hemisphere with the largest
2 s authoctonous population, constitutes a paradoxical and painful omission. 6
V. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE MEXICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

A. Mexico's Official Indigenous Policy
Despite the lack of an explicit reference to the rights of indigenous
peoples in its 1917 Constitution, Mexico has been recognized as a country
who first developed a national policy towards its indigenous peoples. As part
of Latin America, Mexico has been characterized as "a pioneer in the
promotion of a continental indigenous policy." 7
In 1948, the government of Mexico created a National Indigenous

263. In July of 1985, the Sandinista government gave national circulation and discussed
extensively the official document: "Principles and Policies for the Exercise of the Rights of
Autonomy of the Indigenous Peoples and Communities in the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua."
Many of the principles contained in this document were incorporated in the new Constitution of
Nicaragua, enacted on November 19, 1986. For instance, Article 8 of this Constitution reads:
"The people of Nicaragua are of a multiethnic nature." and Article 11: "Spanish is the official
language of the State. The languages of the Communities in the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua
shall also have official use in the cases established by the law." Reprinted in id. at 57-58
(translation by the author).
264. The Constitution of Panama (amended in 1978 and 1983) establishes: "The State shall
guarantee to the Indian communities the amount of necessary lands and the collective property
of the same to promote their economic and social well-being..." Reprinted in id. at 60
(translation by the author).
265. The 1967 Constitution of Paraguay refers to the "Statute on Indigenous Communities"
(Ley Num. 904-1981). Its Article 1 recognizes the legal equality of the Indians in relation with
the other citizens, and Article 50 consecrates the protection of the human rights of indians. Id.
at 50.
266. If it is considered that the 1910 Revolution was initiated and fueled by the indigenous
peoples of Mexico principally to obtain recognition from the government regarding rights they
considered to be inherent (the rights to own land, to be recognized as a special ethnic community
with its own language, culture and system of justice, and to enjoy basic constitutional rights);
it is then paradoxical that in the final text of the 1917 Constitution, which was formulated as a
consequence of the triumph of the revolution, no reference was made to any of the demands
advanced by the indigenous peoples or even to their presence in Mexico as a part of that
country's population. Since the Constitution was promulgated in early 1917 until 1992, when
its Article 4 was amended, its text did not contain any reference to the existence of indigenous
groups as a part of Mexico's population. The only indirect reference that the 1917 Constitution
contained in that regard, was the following:
VII. - The legal personality of groups of populationin ejidos and communities is recognized, and their land property for human settlements and for productive activities
is hereby protected.
CONST. art. 27, para. VII (Mex.) (emphasis and translation by the author).
267. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 300.
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Institute" 8 empowering it as the official organ to design and apply the
indigenous policy in the country. However, it was not until 1992, when
President Salinas de Gortari, in response to demands advanced by indigenous
groups and mounting political pressure, amended Article 4 of the Constitution, to add the following initial paragraph:
The Mexican nation has a pluriethnic composition originally based on its
indigenous peoples. The law shall protect and promote the development of
their languages, cultures, uses, customs, resources and speific forms of
social organzation, uaranteeing to their individual members an effective
access to the jurisdicton of the State. In the agrarian suits and proceedings
in which those members are a party, their legal practices and customs shall
be taken into account in the terms established by the law. 269
The addition of this paragraph, at the time, was deemed a resounding
political success for the Salinas administration and the PRI. In the history of
the country, President Salinas was the first president to acknowledge the
importance of indigenous peoples in the life of the nation, officially
recognizing Mexico as a "pluriethnic society." The Mexican amendment
appears to have taken part of its wording from the Constitution of Guatemala
of 1985. 0
Despite the recent change to the Constitution, the indigenous peoples of
Mexico continue to wait for the enactment of domestic legislation which will
detail their rights, both as individuals and as members of a number of ethnic
minorities, regarding their own territory, language, culture, religion, justice
system, economic base, and form of government.27 1 The first formal
request for this legislation was made at "First Congress of the National
7
Council of Indigenous Peoples," in 1975.12
Partly because of the absence of such a legislation, and partly because
of the official legal equality recognized in favor of indigenous peoples, there
is no definition of what an "Indian person" is, or should be, under Mexican
law. Mexico considers that since all Mexican nationals are the same before
the eyes of the law, the law does not need to discriminate between Mexicans
268. Id. at 304.
269. CONST., art. 4 (Mex.) (translation by the author).
270. For the text of Article 66 see supra note 262. Other articles establish special protective
measures and programs especially designed for the benefit of indigenous peoples, such as
financial and technical assistance, bilingual education, legal title over lands that "historically
belonged" to indigenous communities, land distribution and labor protections to individual members of indigenous groups when they work outside their own rural communities. See generally
id.
271. Although Mexico's amendment to Article 4 of its Constitution was made in 1992, to date
President Salinas has not enacted the corresponding "Ley Reglamentaria." It is up to the new
administration of President Zedillo to introduce to Congress the pertinent legislative bill.
Without the enactment of this implementing legislation, the content of article 4 is merely aspirational.
272. Nemesio Rodriguez, Los Movimientos Indios y sus Planteamientos, in
DERECHO INDIGENA,

supra note 236, at 163. Similar requests have been made in subsequent

indigenous congresses without any results, so far.
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for any reason, whether because they are poor or rich, young or old, Indian
or mestizos.
The lack of a legal definition of an "Indian person" has had adverse
effects upon indigenous peoples. For example, there is no accurate or current
information regarding the number and types of indigenous peoples who live
in Mexico. This lack of information has provoked a controversy among
anthropologists, sociologists, attorneys, indigenous leaders and government
officials, especially regarding the methodology that should be used to identify
and define each of the current ethnic groups.273 The National Indigenous
Institute (INI) recognizes fifty-six different ethnic groups in Mexico. '
Given the drastic and painful inequalities that have prevailed in Mexico
since early this century between the Indians and the mestizos, it is unquestionable that a new official indigenous policy is urgently needed today.
However, no new official policy is likely to succeed unless it is based upon
a new philosophy that recognizes the uniqueness of the value system of
Mexico's indigenous peoples, acknowledges the vast and unfair treatment of
Indians which reinforced the gulf of legal, social, economic, cultural and
political factors between Indians and mestizos, and provides for an educational program to enlighten mestizo Mexicans about the value and uniqueness of
their Indian co-nationals.
B. Education and Culture of Indigenous Peoples
Probably, the areas where Mexico has focused the most regarding
indigenous peoples are education and culture. Both are under the jurisdiction
of the Secretariat of Public Education. Soon after the promulgation of the
1917 Constitution, the government of Mexico put in place a "Policy of
Assimilation of Indian Communities." Initiated in 1917, this program
formally lasted until the 1950s. Its official objective was to "incorporate the
indigenous nucleus into the Mexican nationality." 5
The "assimilation policy" was implemented through two approaches. In
its early stage, the policy attempted to incorporate Indian children into the
mainstream of Mexico's socio-economic and cultural life merely by teaching
them Spanish.'
Indian children had to go to schools and follow the
regular academic program designed by mestizo bureaucrats to educate mestizo

273. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 304.
274. The 56 indigenous peoples are: Amuzgo, Cochimf, Cora, Cucapfi, Cuicateco, Chatino,
Chihimeca, Chinanteca, Chol, Chontal-Maya, Chocho-Mixteco, Chuj, Driqui-Triqui, Guarojfo,
Huave, Huasteco, Huichol, Hocano, Ixcateco, Kikapti, Kiligua, Kurnial, Lacand6n, Marne,
Matlazinca, Maya, Mayo, Mazahua, Mazateco, Mixe, Mixteco, Motozintleco, Nghuatl,
Ocuiteco, Otomi, Pai-pai, Pipago, Pima, Popoloca, Popoluca, Pur6pecha, Seri, Tarahumara,
Tepehua, Tepehuano, Tlapaneco, Tojolabal, Totonaco, Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Yaqui, Yuma, Zapoteco
and Zoque, Carlos Durdn AlcAntara, Legislaci6n en Materia de Poblaciones Indias, in
DERECHOS CONTEMPORANEOS DE LOS PUEBLOS INDIOS 100 (1992).
275. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 313.
276. Id. at 315.
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children, regardless of their Indian language or culture. Legally, Indian
children were considered to be exactly the same as the mestizo children and,
given the equality dictated by the law, teachers felt at the time that it was not
only unnecessary, but even improper, to treat Indian children differently
from the mestizo children. The second, later approach was more flexible.
The Indian children were first educated in their own language, during the six
years of elementary school. Subsequent studies (if any) were imparted in
Spanish only.'
The policy of "assimilation" was criticized by educators and anthropologists, who have suggested since the 1970s that the government abandon that
policy and adopt a "Bilingual-Bicultural Education" policy based upon the
notion of "ethnic development."'
The objectives of this trend, which
influenced the current official policy towards indigenous peoples, include:
recognition of Mexico as a pluri-ethnic nation; respect for indigenous languages and culture; strengthening of bilingual education during the elementary school cycle; and, development of academic programs and activities based
on the ethnic components of a given Indian community. All this was to be
accomplished without minimizing the importance of the Spanish language and
the value of the concept of a Mexican national culture. However, "BilingualBicultural Education" is not yet contained in any legislation. 9
C. AgrarianLaw and Indigenous Peoples
As noted earlier, Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution by no means
resolved those land disputes within rural communities.'
Article 27 laid
down novel legal principles, among them the ejido and the right of rural
communities to possess land for agricultural and other commercial purposes,
as guiding principles upon which to build a legal system devoted to the
distribution of land in a fair and equitable manner. In essence, Article 27
established the foundation which would eventually lead to an elaborate body
of administrative law involving rural questions, now known in Mexico as
"Agrarian Law."281

277. Id. at 315.
278. Id.
279. Id. At the First Congress of the National Council of Indigenous Peoples in 1975 it was
demanded that, through legislation, the President of Mexico should declare as official languages
"the indigenous languages that exist in our country, especially if it is considered that until now
those indigenous languages have been despised, reputing them as valueless since they do not
fulfill a social function as vehicles or instruments of communication." (Translation by the
author). Id. at 315. Regarding bilingual education for indigenous peoples in Mexico, see JULIO
GARDUJ O CERVANTES, EL FINAL DEL SILENCIO (1983).

280. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
281. The granting, holding and regulation of different types of agricultural lands, and the
intense and persistent problems associated with this process, is at the core of Agrarian Law.
Politically, this land program, and its impact upon indigenous communities, was turned into the
most important rural program by the PRI, under the label of "Reforma Agraria" (i.e. agrarian
reform). On these matters, see MARTHA CHAVEZ PADRdN, DERECHO AGRARIO EN MExICO (Ed.
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Problems associated with the holding and distribution of land were
included among the major causes of the 1910 Revolution. In the southern
States of Chiapas and Oaxaca, similar land problems continue today.'
The treatment and control of these rural problems has tended to be more
political than legal, resulting in a series of a chronic and violent confrontations during which caciques, ranchers and sometimes even public authorities
have displayed a pattern of abusive behavior in violation of the constitutional
and human rights of indigenous peoples. These abusive practices have been
so egregious that, in recent years, they have attracted widespread attention
from Mexican" and international observers, particularly from NGOs in the
United States.'
Under Agrarian Law, Mexican nationals, but in particular indigenous
peoples and rural communities, have a constitutional right to obtain lands
from the government by means of "restitution" or ejidos.' However,
numerous land problems continue to plague indigenous communities. First,
not all campesinos who have the legal right to a piece of land, and who have
already applied for said lands, have received them.
Second, although
ejidos in theory are communal lands for the collective use of a rural community, numerous ejidos have been appropriated by individual ejidatarios.This

Porria, Mdxico, 1993); RAOL LEMUS GARCIA, DERECHO AGRARIO MEXICANO (Ed. Limusa,

M6xico, 1992).
282. In the most recent Americas Watch Report (June 1990), ch. VI, devoted to "Rural
Violence" reads:
Rural violence is an unabating problem in Mexico. It grows out of long-standing disputes over land and out of frustrations by peasants and members of Indian communities over the inadequacies of Mexico's land reform program. The Mexican
government responds as though the violence were an inevitable by-product of landrelated tensions in the countryside, and rarely intervenes.
A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note 151.
283. PRUDENCIO MOSCOSO PASTRANA, REBELIONES INDIGENAS EN LOS ALTOS DE CHIAPAS
(1992); MARIA DEL CARMEN LE6N CAZARES, UN LEVANTAMIENTO EN NOMBRE DEL REY

NUESTRO SE4OR (1988); GRACIELA FLORES L0A ET AL, LAS VOCES DEL CAMPO: MOVIMIENTO
CAMPESINO Y POLITICA AGRARIA, 1976-1984 (XXX Editores 1988); Anm Bella P6rez Castro,
ENTRE MONTAI4AS Y CAFETALES: LUCHAS AGRARIAS EN EL NORTE DE CHIAPAS (1989); ANA
MARIA SALAZA, LA PARTICIPACION ESTATAL Y LA COMERCIALIZACION DEL CAFE EN EL

ESTADO DE CHIAPAS (1988).

See also Rodriguez (Chap. VI) and Violaciones a los Derechos

Indtgenas, (Chap. VII) in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 145-206 and 207-216,
respectively.
284. Some of the most recent publications include AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEXICO: LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ZONAS RURALES: INTERCAMBIO DE DOCUMENTOS CON EL GOBIERNO
MEXICANO SOBRE VIOLACIONES DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN OAXACA Y CHIAPAS (1986)
[hereinafter DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ZONAS RURALES]; A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note
151; AMERICAS WATCH, UNCEASING ABUSES: HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO ONE YEAR AFTER
THE INTRODUCTION OF REFORM (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter UNCEASING ABUSES]; CONQUEST
CONTINUED, supra note 12; and MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CIVILIANS AT
RISK: MILITARY AND POLICE ABUSES IN THE MEXICAN COUNTRYSIDE (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter
CIVILIANS AT RISK].

285. Regarding the "restitution of lands and waters" under Agrarian Law, see Mario Ruiz
Massieu, DERECHO AGRARIO REVOLUCIONARIO, 321-27 (1987).
286. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 306.
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common irregularity has created severe problems within rural communities,
deeply straining the relations between the affected ejidatarios.'
A third problem derives from an arbitrary and illegal practice: a
substantial number of ejidos have been allocated to individual owners by the
Board of Directors who legally control the ejido. This allocation usually
applies to the best lands, thus creating violent disputes among
ejidatarios.2ss Finally, the administrative process established by Agrarian
Law for the granting of lands to indigenous communities (i.e. "restitution of
lands") is quite long and bureaucratic, taking some 15 years to be completed.
As a result, when the lands are finally granted, the community that receives
them is very different demographically. This chronological gap often creates
severe problems between older and younger ejidatarios.8 9
Not surprisingly, the most volatile problem is when the ejidatarios,tired
of waiting to obtain their lands and discouraged by official redtape,
unanswered petitions, arbitrary acts by landowners and corruption, turn to
violent and illegal means and "invade" lands in the vicinity physically
possessed or legally owned by others. This triggers violent reactions from
caciques and rancheros(i.e. cattle and plantation landowners). 2' These confrontations, which take place frequently in Chiapas and Oaxaca, often result
in violence against the Indians by landowners whose lands were invaded,291
or in the detention and criminal prosecution of Indians. 2"
Since 1929, the Confederaci6n Nacional Campesina (National Peasant
Confederation, or CNC) has been the PRI's rural arm in Mexico. The CNC
plays a decisive role not only in electing the representatives in the Comisariados ejidales and the Comisariadosde Bienes Comunales, whose intervention
is essential in land reform allocation and restitution pursuant to Mexican
Agrarian Law, but in mobilizing people for elections. The CNC mobilizes
peasants and other members of rural communities to participate in the
elections of municipal mayors, state governors, local legislators, federal
deputies, and senators, and the president.2'

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. In a recent report produced at the end of a fact-finding mission "to investigate current
human rights practices in the State of Chiapas," Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
(MAHR) concluded: "Where the complexity of the current legal status of land makes the
regularization of land tenancy disputes and petitions impracticable within reasonable time limits,
investigate and propose alternate temporary measures which impart a sense of justice and
fairness for all concerned." CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at 71.
290. Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 306-07. For a detailed account of
the arbitrary and illegal acts committed against Indians in Chiapas, see Agrarian Conflict and
Constitutional Changes (Chap. VII) CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at 59-69.
291. CONQUEST CONTINUED, supra note 12, at 62.
292. Id.
293.
[The PRI has dominated Chiapas politics for more than six decades. Over the past
several years, however, it has enjoyed such an impressive showing at the polls that
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However, during the last two decades, indigenous peoples in Chiapas
and Oaxaca, probably disillusioned with the failed promises made by the PRI
to resolve chronic land problems, started creating rural organizations to
support their land demands and to politically advance their cause. 29 These
political associations arrange for campesinos with no lands to have access to
rural lands in order to improve their labor conditions and raise their sala-

ries. 2' To pursue their ends, these associations organize protests, marches
and demonstrations, as well as illegal invasions of lands which usually lead
to violent acts, including insults, rampage, thefts, battery and even murder. 2 9

The increasing number of violent acts committed by activists from these
organizations has resulted in a gradual escalation of the degree of violence
utilized by CNC members, ranchers and their guardiasblancas, as well as
state and federal authorities, to repel these acts in the states of Chiapas and
Oaxaca, during the last fifteen years. 297 As a consequence, leaders and
activists from these organizations have complained that they have been
subjected to numerous constitutional and human rights violations, such as
harassment, intimidation, death threats, summary executions, disappearances,
and torture at the hands of individuals who control the political, socioeco-

nomic, and legal institutions in that part of Mexico.29 These charges have
been documented by Amnesty International in two memoranda, one
submitted in 1984 to the then-President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, 29 and
the other to high officials of the government of Mexico at the federal and

critics have questioned the validity of the vote. In 1991, for example, the PRI won
100% of the vote in 50 municipalities, ranking Chiapas as its strongest State.
Walker, supra note 46, at A8.
294. Such groups include: Coordinadora Nacional Plan d Ayala (CNPA); Movimiento d
Unificacion y Lucha Triqui (MULT); Coalicion Obrera Campensina Estudiantil del Istmo
(COCEI); Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Zapata (CEZ); and Central Independiente de
Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos (CIOAC). For a detailed description of each of these
organizations, see DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ZONAS RURALES, supra note 284, at 18.
295. Id. at 19. The CIOAC was formed in 1975 and is affiliated to the Socialist Unified Party
of Mexico (PSUM).
296. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 32.
297. See DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ZONAS RURALES, supra note 284, at 20-41.
298. Id.
299. For a reference to the content of this 45-page memorandum, dated October 31, 1984,
see DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ZONAs RURALES, supra note 284, at 13. In this memorandum
Amnesty International expressed its concern on certain reports indicating that "members of
organizations and peasant groups of the opposition, implicated in land disputes for land tenure,
had lost their lives in circumstances suggesting that they had been summarily executed. . ." In
addition, it made reference to "cases of detentions not acknowledged [by the authorities] and
torture in both states" [Chiapas and Oaxaca], and provided specific details in cases involving
eight inmates criminally accused or convicted, but considered as prisoners of conscience by
Amnesty International (translation by author).
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D. Contemporary "Mexican Ethnic Law"
Mexico's civil legislation is contained in its Civil Code3"' and it applies
to all Mexicans, regardless of their ethnic origin. 31 However, numerous
indigenous peoples continue to regulate social relations within their
communities in accordance with traditional rules and norms, which form a

special type of customary law, 3 an unwritten law solely based upon

custom and tradition.3°
Anthropologists and social workers have documented that most ethnic
groups in Mexico live by their own traditional rules and principles regarding
marriage, adoption, treatment of children, adultery, inheritance, contractual
arrangements, property, possession, etc.' However, Mexico's contemporary legal system has not provided for institutional mechanisms which would
allow the application of indigenous customary law to specific cases involving
members of ethnic groups. 3 Public authorities in Mexico apply the law
which is contained in official legal enactments to all Mexican nationals
without making distinctions based on ethnic origin. Therefore, indigenous

300. "Los Derechos Humanos en el Sureste de M6xico. Conclusiones de una Investigaci6n
de Amnistfa Internacional en torno a violaciones de los Derechos Humanos en los Estados de
Oaxaca y Chiapas," November 22, 1985, reprintedin id. at 12-15.
301. Formally, Mexico has two civil codes: one federal, which applies throughout Mexico on
federal matters and to the Federal District (Mexico City) on ordinary matters; and 31 state
codes, one for each state forming the Republic of Mexico. Inspired by French, Spanish, German
and Italian legal sources, this code is divided into four books: Persons, Assets, Succession and
Contracts. It was published in Mexico's Official Daily (Diario Oficial or D.O.) on March 26,
1926, entering into force on October 1, 1932. It has been amended several times, most recently
by decree published in D.O. January 7, 1988.
302. Article 10 of the Civil Code for the Federal District provides:
The Mexican laws apply to all persons located in the Republic [of Mexico], as well
as to actions and [factual] happenings which have taken place within its territory or
jurisdiction and to those [actions or happenings] which have submitted to said laws,
save when these [laws] provide for the application of foreign law and save, further,
what is provided in the treaties and conventions to which Mexico is a party.
CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL DIsTRITo FEDERAL, 59th ed. (Editorial Porrua 1991) (Mex.) at 42
(translation by the author).
303. See Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 309.
304. The conciseness of this note suggests the need of legal researchers in Mexico to identify
and analyze the legal content of indigenous customary law-a true "Mexican Ethnic Law"- as
well as to contribute to enrich this new law based upon the latest international trends in this
field.
305. For some interesting cases involving the application of "indigenous customary law" in
civil and penal areas, see Nahmad in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 309-12.
306. As previously reported, in response to the mounting political pressure that indigenous
peoples have been exerting for decades upon the federal government, President Salinas de
Gortari decided to amend Article 4 of Mexico's Constitution in 1992, adding a short paragraph
to finally recognize some of the most fundamental rights of indigenous peoples. See supra notes
269-71 and accompanying text.
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customary law or "Mexican Ethnic Law" is not officially recognized.
"Mexican Ethnic Law" can be defined as customary law created and
derived from the culture and value system characteristic of a given ethnic
community and is applied by certain indigenous peoples to regulate their
social, economic, and cultural relations within that community. Anthropolo-

gists recognized that the existence and application of this "Mexican Ethnic
Law" does not center exclusively on civil law but that it embraces other
areas as well, such as penal and labor law.' Furthermore, this customary

law has developed institutions for conflict resolution and justice within
certain ethnic communities.30° Generally, these mechanisms for conflict
resolution are based upon an evaluation of the case and a decision rendered

by a group of elderly or wise men, endowed with both civil and religious
authority.""
Despite the fact that the existence of these peculiar but intriguing forms
of Mexican Ethnic Law have been acknowledged virtually since the
Spaniards arrived at what is now Mexico in 1519, very little research has
been conducted in this field in recent times. Most modem works have been
devoted to describing ancient "Mexican Ethnic Law," namely, the basic rules
and principles of indigenous customary law as they were practiced by

indigenous groups prior to the conquest of Mexico in 1521.
For instance, early this century, a number of eminent Mexican jurists

continued the nationalist trend initiated in Colonial times by chronists and
priests31 0 to document and revive interest in "Mexican Pre-Colonial Law"
(Derecho Precolonial Mexicano). This academic effort to document the
history of Mexican Law was led by Jacinto Pallares,31' Toribio Esquivel
Obreg6n 1 2 and Lucio Mendieta y Nfifiez.31 3 However, contemporary

307. See generally Nahmad, in DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236, at 312 and 310
respectively. For example, certain indigenous groups engage in the practice of certain forms
of collective work for the benefit of a given community; peasants help a campesino when the
family members of the campesino family are not able to assist with the agricultural labor or
when the campesino has no money to pay workers for these services. This collective form of
labor assists in preparing the land for seeding, picking up the crops, and even building houses.
Id. at 313.
In the penal law area, customary law among certain indigenous groups provides, for instance, that a member of a given indigenous community who murders another member contracts the
obligation of providing sustenance to the victim's widow and children. Id. at 310.
308. See FERNANDO BENfTEZ, LOS INDIOS DE MEXICO (1981).
309. Depending upon the ethnic group in question, these groups of elderly or wise men are
known as "Los Mandones" or "Los Gobernadores." Id.
310. Some of these early scholars included Bernal Dfaz del Castillo, Clavijero, Motolinfa, etc.
See GUILLERMO F. MARGADANT, INTRODUCCION A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO MEXICANO 9-26
(Ed. Esfinge. 6th ed., M6xico, 1984); and Maria del Refugio Gonzdlez, Historiadel Derecho
MeXicano, INTRODUCCION AL DERECHO MEXICANOI 1-108 (Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas.
UNAM, 2d. ed., Mdxico, 1983).
311. Jacinto Pallares, Historia del Derecho Mexicano, CURSO COMPLETO DE DERECHO
MEXICANO (Exposici6n Filos6fica y Doctrinal de Toda la Legislaci6n Mexicana) Mdxico, 1904.
312. ToRIBIo ESQUIVEL OBREG6N, APUNTES PARA LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO EN MEXICO

(Editorial Polis, Mdxico, 1937).
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Mexican legal scholars have not shown the same interest in studying the
content, institutions, and application of current Mexican Ethnic Law. Legal
literature in this field is greatly needed and it should be produced throughout
Mexico.31 4
VI. UNITED STATES-MEXICO RELATIONS

Traditionally, diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico
have been sensitive and complicated. The origin of this sensitivity may be
traced back to the war between these nations, which brought disastrous
territorial and emotional consequences to Mexico. The military confrontation
of 1846-48 has been characterized as a most arbitrary and unjust war, a clear
interventionist policy designed by the United States with the exclusive
purpose of severing from Mexico more than half of its vast but unpopulated
territories, including the lands which later became the states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.3"5
Despite the relatively long time that has elapsed since then, the traumatic
consequences of that tragic war profoundly influenced, and sometimes even
dictated, the bilateral policy that Los Pinos and Tlatelolco maintained with
the U.S. during the last 140 years. The complicated nature of the relationship
of Mexico with the United States does not originate exclusively from historic
sources. Geographical contiguity, which fosters and facilitates growing
interaction between the two nations, and the increasing economic importance
of the relations between them, principally those associated with trade,
investments and business, no doubt contribute to this complexity.
However, the administration of President Salinas de Gortari undertook
a vigorous effort not only to change this traditional and long-held policy
towards the United States, but to profoundly modernize his country in key
areas of the social, economic, political and legal arenas.
Probably because of Mexico's keen sensitivity to foreign interference in
its domestic affairs, especially when it comes from its northern neighbor, the
government of the United States has customarily maintained a very low
official profile in evaluating Mexico's human rights record. This low-key
approach has produced some frustration among NGOs in this country.
Human Rights Watch, for example, has charged that "[T]he United States
313. See Luclo MENDIETA Y Nf1fEz, EL DERECHO PRECOLONIAL (Editorial Porrda. Cuarta
edici6n, M6xico, 1981).
314. The constitutional amendment to Article 4, made by President Salinas de Gortari in
1992, appears to have generated some interest among legal researchers on the topic of human
rights of indigenous peoples in Latin America. See, e.g., DERECHO INDIGENA, supra note 236.
315. See the works of the eminent internationalist Cesar Sepulveda; in particular, CHAPTER
VII: EXPLIACION BAJo OTRO NOMBRE (1846-1848), LA FRONTERA NORTE DE MEXICO.

HISTORIA, CONFLICTOS, 1762-975 57-80 (1976). See also GLEN W. PRICE, ORIGINS OF THE
WAR WITH MEXICO: THE POLK-STOCKTON INTRIGUE (1967); CHARLES SELLER, JAMES K.
POLK. CONTINENTALIST, 1843-1846 (1966); RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE RISING
AMERICAN EMPIRE (1960) and Richard R. Stenberg, PresidentPolk and California: Additional
Docunents, PACIFIC HISTORICAL REv., June, 1941, at 217-20.
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has a long-standing policy of ignoring human rights violations occurring in
Mexico." 3 6 The rationale behind this policy is thought to be based on the
security,
business and investment interests the U.S. has at stake in Mexi3 17
co.

Also, during the legislative process to appropriate funds to Mexico in the
form of foreign aid or technical assistance, for instance, neither the
Executive, nor the U.S. Congress tend to recognize the existence of any
human rights concerns. This is done notwithstanding that U.S. domestic
legislation prohibits the granting of military or economic assistance to foreign
nations which engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. "318
However, the "U.S. Department of State 1993 Human Rights Report"
(published in 1994), contains the following comment on Mexico:
In 1993 there continued to be widespread human rights abuses and a
frequent failure to punish violators despite [Mexico's] government efforts
to do so. Important abuses included extrajudicial killings by the police,
torture, illegal arrests, glaring prison deficiencies, and extensive illegal
child labor in the informal economy. The [Mexican] government has made
strong efforts to end the "culture of impunity" surrounding the security
forces through reforms in the Office of the Attorney General (PGR),
continued support to the National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH),
and establishment in 1993 of state-level commissions for human rights.
These actions together with increased public awareness of human rights
concerns have brought
about a noticeable decline in the incidence of
violations in Mexico.319
The reasons for the U.S. government to maintain this policy vis-i-vis
Mexico may not be as paradoxical as it may appear. The U.S. maintained
similar policies regarding Chile during the Pinochet regime,3 2° the Somoza
government in Nicaragua, 321 and maintains a similar policy regarding the
People's Republic of China today."
Some valid arguments may support this U.S. policy. First, this may be
attributable to the unprecedented good relations which currently exist between

316. A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note 151, at 83.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2 (1994) (emphasis added).
This official report comprises the following five sections: 1) Respect for the Integrity of the
Person; 2) Respect for Civil Liberties; 3) Respect for Political Rights; 4) Governmental Attitude
regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights; 5) Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or Social Status;
and 6) Worker Rights.
320. William Chapman, End to Ban on Chile Aid Voted, Senate Would Allow Reagan to
Resume Military Assistance; Senate Votes, 86 to 0, to Repeal Ban on Military Assistance to
Chile, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1981, at Al.

321. Alan Riding, U.S. Loses Ground in Central America and Backs Changes in a Bid to
Recoup, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1980, at A10.
322. Paul Houston, Senate Says No To Bush China Policy, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1991, at Al.
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the two countries. In the words of Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary
of State, "never before in history has the United States enjoyed better
relations with its neighbor to the south and third largest trading partner." 3'
Second, the volume of U.S. trade investment, and business with Mexico
grows substantially every year, and is likely to expand even further because
of NAFTA. 3u Third, Mexico continues to show a high degree of commitment in the fight against drugs, in close coordination with the U.S. 3" And,
finally, there is no question that, in the eyes of the government of the United
States, Mexico is legitimately engaged in a strong and permanent campaign
to eradicate human rights violations. 3"
The Salinas administration's efforts in favor of human rights are
illustrated in the following sections.
A. Changes in Governmental Agencies
These changes are taking place at the federal, state and local levels ."
Federally, President Salinas has transformed the administrative structure and
functions of the Attorney General's Office (ProcuraduriaGeneral de la
Reptiblica or PGR), empowered to prosecute and investigate federal crimes,
notably those which are drug related. 3"
For a number of years, the prosecution and investigation of certain
crimes, in particular those associated with drugs, conducted by Mexico's
federal judicial police, have been a constant source of human rights
violations. As stated in a recent report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives:
Chief among our human rights concerns in Mexico is mistreatment of
detainees by Mexican police, particularly the Mexican Federal Judicial
Police, or the MFJP. The MFJP is the investigative arm of the Attorney
General's Office and has traditionally enjoyed considerable immunity from
prosecution for its human rights abuses. Furthermore, members of the

323. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 20th Sess. 1 (1994) (statement of Alexander F. Watson. Asst. Sec.
of State) [hereinafter Western Hemisphere Affairs].
324. United States exports to Mexico rose 15.7 percent, to a record $11.85 billion, seasonally
adjusted, in the first quarter compared with the comparable quarter a year earlier, according to
the Commerce Department. Imports from Mexico rose 22.5 percent, to a record $11.29 billion.
That narrowed the nation's quarterly trade surplus with Mexico by 45.1 percent, to $560
million. Allen R. Meyerson, U.S.-Mexico Trade Advances Sharply Under New Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1994, at Al.
325. U.S. Says Mexico Vastly Improving Its Anti-Drug War, U.P.I., Nov. 14, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
326. See generally CARPIZO, supra note 176.

327. At the federal level, the restructuring of the Attorney General's Office and the creation
of an Institute to train federal prosecutors deserves a special mention. The creation of state
commissions of human rights, directed by a constitutional mandate, is a most significant development at the state level. On these matters, see infra notes 333-334 and accompanying text.
328. See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
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MFJP often employ what are called madrinas, or private agents to assist
them in their investigations. Because there are no legal provisions
governing their existence, the madrinas are even further beyon the reach
of the law.329

The changes introduced in the Attorney General's Office, and in criminal
procedure law, are progressive measures to do away with human rights
violations and with the impunity traditionally enjoyed by the agents of the
MFJP. The amendments to the Penal Code and to the Code of Penal
Procedure were formally initiated in 1989,13 in a legislative process which

has continued until today.331 Most of the procedural amendments introduced by President Salinas closely parallel the constitutional guarantees and
other protections provided to criminal defendants in the United States.332
Substantially, these procedural changes were made to expedite the rendering

of penal justice, as well as to protect the fundamental rights of any person
accused of a crime.333

Probably the most significant change in penal proceedings introduced by
these amendments consists in not relying solely upon the confession of the

accused as the only means to determine his or her guilt. Other probative
elements must be utilized in criminal proceedings now. The Judicial Police
has been legally deprived of what used to be its most feared function: to hear

the confession of the accused. A new provision in the Code dictates that any
confessions rendered to the Judicial Police have no probative value and are
null and void. 33
The following are now considered to be fundamental rights of the
accused: (1) legal counsel should assist the accused (el inculpado) from the
beginning to the end of penal proceedings; (2) the accused has the right to
329. Western Hemisphere Affairs, supra note 328, at 6.
330. The 1989 amendments to the Penal Code created a number of cr'mes when committed
by policemen or by customs or immigration agents involved in an investigation, including certain
types of behavior associated with any kind of public office (i.e. Abuso de autoridad). For an
analysis of these amendments, see RUBIN VALDEZ ABASCAL, LA MODERNIZACION JURIDICA

NACIONAL DENTRO DEL LIBERALISMO SOCIAL 196-226 (1990).
331. See Decreto que enmienda, adiciona y deroga varios articulos del Codigo Penal para el
Districto Federal (Decree that amends, adds and repeals several articles of the Penal Code for
the Federal District in Ordinary Matters and for the entire Republic in Federal Matters, of the
Federal Code of Penal Procedure, of the Code of Penal Procedure for the Federal District, of
the "Amparo" Act (derived from Articles 103 and 107 of the Federal Constitution), and other
provisions, D. 0. of January 10, 1994, Second Section, at 1-40 (translation by the author).
332. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also infra note 347 and
accompanying text.
333. The 1988 and 1989 amendments to the Code of Penal Procedure were directed at
strengthening the prosecutorial functions of the Agente del Ministerio Pdiblico (i.e. Public
Prosecutor) and to control and regulate the functions of the Judicial Police, who should "only
assist" the Ministerio Ptblico. As a result of these changes, the Judicial Police is no longer
authorized to (1) subpoena persons to render declarations, (2) receive declarations, (3) conduct
interrogatories, or (4) record in writing (i.e. levantar actas) any declarations, statements or
interrogatories; all of these official functions are exclusively reserved to the Ministerio Publico
now. See ABASCAL, supra note 330, at 208.
334. Id. at 208-09.
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be assisted by legal counsel when rendering a declaration; (3) legal counsel
has the right to challenge any improper or legally unauthorized questions to
be answered by the accused; (4) the accused has the right to know the
criminal charges filed against him/her, as well as the name of the accuser,
if any; (5) the accused has the right to contact any person immediately, and
with his/her legal counsel; (6) to this effect, a telephone, or other adequate
means, should be made available to the accused; (7) the defense counsel has
the right to know the nature and the specific type of criminal charges filed
against the accused; (8) the accused has the right to keep silent and not to
incriminate him/herself; (9) a confession which does not comply with the
"formalities established by the law" may not be utilized at all; such
formalities include, inter alia, that the declaration should be rendered in the
presence of the defense counsel or of a person trusted (personade confianza)
by the accused.335
In sum, the changes in governmental agencies, coupled with the
profound transformation that is taking place in the Mexican legal system in
areas associated with the protection of fundamental rights, have contributed
to create a new climate that favors a modern and more expeditious system of
justice, sanctions abusive practices of authorities (in particular those of the
Judicial Police), and implements an enhanced respect of and recognition for
human rights.
B. Legislative Changes
President Salinas de Gortari has initiated a profound legal transformation
of his country's legal system.336 In the human rights area, those changes
started at the highest level: by amending Mexico's 1917 Constitution. 7
Article 4 of the Constitution was amended, as indicated earlier,338 in
order to recognize the existence of human rights in favor of the indigenous
peoples. Articles 18 through 22 were also modified to expand the constitutional rights of accused persons in criminal proceedings,339 including the

335. Id. at 211-212; RENI GONZALEZ DE LA VEGA, LA JUSTICIA: LOGROS Y RETOS (1993).
336. JORGE CARPIZO, ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS EN ToP.NO A LA CONSTITUCION MEXICANA DE

1917 EN su LXXV ANIVERSARIO viii (1992)

Dr. Carpizo wrote that since its promulgation in

1917, the Constitution of Mexico has been amended 375 times. During his tenure, President
Salinas has amended the Constitution eleven times, for a grand total of 383 amendments.
337. Affecting the area of human rights, President Salinas has made amendments to the
following ten articles of Mexico's 1917 Constitution: Articles 3, 4, 5, 14, 16, 24, 27, 31, 102,
Section B; and 130. See JORGE MADRAZO, DERECHOS HUMANOS: EL NUEVO ENFOQUE AT

MEXICANO 52, 91-101 (1993).
338. The addition to Article 4 of the Constitution, recognizing "Mhe Mexican nation as
having a pluricultural composition, originally based in its Indigenous peoples," was accomplished by means of a Presidential decree published in D.C. Jan. 28, 1992, supra note 293 and
accompanying text.
339. For more detailed information, see infra notes at 312-13 and accompanying text.
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investigations and interrogatories conducted by the police.'
Other constitutional amendments with human rights consequences were
made also to Articles 3, 31, 27, and 131. The changes to the first two
articles enlarged the authority of the state in the area of public education. 4
Article 27 drastically transformed the ancient land institution of the ejido,
legally allowing ejidatariosto hold individual title in ejidos and to transfer
and alienate them. 342 Article 130 was amended to "modernize"I 3 the
relations between church and state, which had been a delicate question since
the enactment of the Leyes de Reforma. Mexico now recognizes legal
personality of churches; the right of religious associations to acquire real
estate; the constitutional right of churches to conduct external religious
ceremonies; non-religious education in public schools; a special personal
legal status for religious ministers; and, the application of civil provisions to
these matters.3144
Federal and State codes of penal procedure,1 5 as well as penal
codes,' have been also changed to put them in symmetry with the new
constitutional provisions. Most of the improvements introduced by these
amendments, designed to guarantee the constitutional rights to the accused
and to provide them due process, appear to have been inspired by U.S.
law.' Furthermore, most of these procedural changes were formulated
340. For a comment on the effects of these amendments, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra 319, at 2-9; and CurrentDevelopments, supra note 177.
341. See MADRAZO, supra note 337, at 98. Based upon these amendments (D.O. of March
5, 1993), the government of Mexico, inter alia, is empowered to impart not only elementary
education (as established since 1917) but also pre-school (kindergarten) and secondary education.
342. D.O. Jan. 6 and 28, 1992. For a commentary on these amendments, MADRAZO, supra
note 337, at 95-96. Madrazo states that the amendments' objectives stemmed from the
necessity of expanding justice and freedom in the countryside . . . searching for a better legal
certainty in the countryside, to capitalize it and to protect and strengthen the ejido and the
communal way of living." MADRAZO, supra note 243, at 95. This change allowed, inter alia,
civil and commercial corporations to operate in rural areas, provided said corporations complied
with limitations imposed on the "small individual property." (translation by the author).
MADRAZO, supra note 337, at 95-96.
343. See PRESIDENT CARLOS SALINAS DE GORTARI, THIRD STATE OF THE NATION REPORT.
Presidencia de la Reptiblica. Mexico, November 1, 1991, at 20.
344. D.O. January 28, 1992. See also MADRAZO, supra note 337, at 100-101.
345. Presidential decree amending several provisions of the Federal Code of Penal Procedure
and the Code of Penal Procedure for the Federal District, D.O. January 8, 1991. For the
respective texts, see MADRAZO, supra note 337, at 221-46 (translation by the author).
346. Presidential decree amending provisions of the Penal Code for the Federal District in
ordinary matters and for the entire Republic on federal matters; the Federal Code of Penal
Procedure, and the Code of Penal Procedure for the Federal District, D.C. December 30, 1991.
For these texts, see MADRAZO, supra 337, at 247-63.
347. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 478-79 (1966). Under Miranda, prior to any
custodial interrogation, the person must be warned that: (a) he has the right to remain silent; (b)
any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; (c) he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior
to any questioning if he so desires. Unless and until these warnings or a waiver of these rights
are demonstrated at trial, no evidence obtained during the interrogation may be used against the
accused. See also Giordenello v. U.S., 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958). According to the Court in
Giordenello, a police officer who wishes to obtain an arrest warrant must present to a magistrate
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and proposed to interested parties in Mexico, such as attorneys, legislators
and the CNDH, by certain NGOs from the United States, in particular the
Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee and Amnesty
International U.S.A.3'
C. Conventional InternationalLaw

In conjunction with its foreign policy, the government of Mexico has
adhered to the most important international human rights conventions, both
at the universal and regional levels. However, actions of the Mexican Army

during the Chiapas rebellion violated many of these conventions. These
actions appear to be in contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights; 9 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights;35 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;35' the

American Convention on Human Rights;352 the Convention Against Torture

or judge a statement under oath setting forth the essential facts constituting the offense and the
facts that led the officer seeking the warrant to believe that the defendant committed the act.
348. See the works of these NGO's cited in supra note 284. In addition, see JAIL
CONDITIONS IN MEXICO Amnesty International, U.S.A.
349. G.A. Res. 217A(!), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 17 (1948).
350. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3. At the time of depositing the instrument of adhesion (March 23, 1981), Mexico
made a formal reservation in relation to Article 8 of the Pact, regarding the formation of unions
and the workers' right to strike. Mexico's reservation provided that this article should be applied
"under the conditions and in conformity with the proceedings established by the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution and its complementary legislation" (translation by the author). For
the text of the reservation, see Pacto InternacionalDerechos Economicos Sociales y Culturales,
D.O. of May 12, 1981, reprinted in LEGISLACI6N, supra note 219, at 145-60.
351. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). Mexico made two formal reservations to
Articles 13.1 and 25.1, para. (b) of the covenant, regarding the expulsion of foreign nationals
(since Article 33 of Mexico's Constitution grants absolute power to the Mexican Executive to
deport foreigners without any formal proceedings) and the right to vote in free elections since
Article 13 of Mexico's Constitution provided (when the reservation was made) that the
"ministers of cults have neither an active nor a passive vote, nor the right to associate for
political purposes" (translation by the author). For the text of this Pact, and the reservations, see
Pacto Internacional de Derechos iviles y Politicos, D.O. May 20, 1981, reprinted in
LEGISLACION, supra note 219, at 161-86. For a discussion of the Mexican Army's actions
violating

the covenant,

see

PHYSICIANS

FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS

AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS

supra note 231, at 114.
352. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/lI.23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979). While depositing its instrument
of adhesion (March 24, 1981), Mexico made a declaration and a formal reservation. See
Convencion Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos, D.O. May 7, 1981, reprinted in
LEGISLACI6N, supra note 219, at 187-219. In its recent report, Human Rights Watch/Americas
concludes: "Torture and cruel treatment, as well as prolonged detention in violation of Mexican
law, were common features of Army detention." THE NEw YEARS REBELuON, supra note 180,
at 2. In its formal petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States, asserts that on March 31, 1993, the Centro de Derechos
Humanos "Fray Bartolom6 de las Casas" issued a public statement documenting the Mexican
Army's involvement in detaining and torturing several local residents after two members of the
military were killed by unknown attackers, Petition, supra note 229, at 5.
WATCH/AMERICAS,
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and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;3 53 the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; 3 the Convention of Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife;355 and the
International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi35 6
nation.
D. Creation of the National Commission of Human Rights
As a corollary to this comprehensive effort, in June 1990, the President
of Mexico created the National Commission of Human Rights (CNDH). 5 7
Furthermore, based upon another amendment to the Constitution,35 8 it is
now obligatory for every state in the Republic of Mexico, and for the Federal
District, to create state commissions to guarantee the respect and promotion
of human rights within their respective jurisdictions. In its 1993 Report, the
U.S. State Department points out that these state commissions, which became
operational in 1993, were established "by legislation, not executive
order. "159
In a ceremony to commemorate the CNDH's fourth anniversary in early
June of 1994, President Salinas said:
During these years, Mexicans have undertaken a joint effort towards
a better protection and defense of human rights, a task which is still unfmished. Because of this, we support with factual deeds the performance of
the National Commission of Human Rights and, at the same time, we shall
endeavor to make more efficient the work of the organs which impart
justice.'

353. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). Convencion Controla Tortura y Otros Tratos o Pennnas Crueles,
Inhumanos o Degradantes, D.O. March 6, 1986, reprinted in LEGIsLACI6N, supra note 219, at
221-28.
354. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S. Treaty
Ser. No. 67, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. P/AG/doc.2023/85 rev. 1, at 46. D.C. of September 11,
1987.
355. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20,
1928, 46 Stat. 2749, 134 LNTS 45. Mexico adhered to this convention on February 6, 1929;
D.O. of March 18, 1929.
356. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, D.C. of January 13, 1975 and January 18, 1975.
357. D.O. of June 6, 1990. On the origins and constitutionality of the CNDH, see Carpizo,
supra note 326, at 115-34.
358. Presidential decree that amends Article 102 of the Constitution, D.O. January 28, 1992.
For the text of this decree, see MADRAZO, supra note 337, at 127-29. See also CARPIZO, supra
note 319, at 120-34.
359. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1993 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 319, at 17
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
360. Stenographic version of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's speech, Segundo Informe
anual de actividades de Jorge Madruzo Cuellar, Presidente de la Comision Nacional de Derechos
Humanos, Leido durante la ceremonia efectuada en el Salon Manuel Avila Camacho de la
Residencia official de los Pinos (Junio 1994) (translation by the author).
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There is no doubt that the U.S. government could harden its policy
towards Mexico on human rights questions, as it is being advocated by some
of its critics .361 However, the key question is whether this change of the
U.S. policy is likely to produce the desired results in Mexico: namely, a
consistent and institutional improvement in the overall protection of human
rights. Human rights violations are among the most sensitive issues on the
agenda of the government of Mexico. Because of its grave legal and political
implications, the mere existence of this problem has not been officially
recognized until most recently.362
In an article in Mexico City's daily El Nacional, Mariclaire Acosta, the
President of the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of
Human Rights, asserted that the Salinas administration is "the first one to
recognize that this [persistent violation of human rights] is a grave problem."363 Previous administrations did not acknowledge the existence of this
problem, recognizing it only as minor and sporadic, notwithstanding the
voluminous number of cases and incontrovertible evidence accumulated by
NGOs.3 '
The intense controversy the negotiating process and final approval of
NAFTA generated in the United States and Canada, was a key factor in the
emergence, presence, and visibility of human rights, as a public topic. Had
it not been for NAFTA, the question of human rights in Mexico would have
taken considerably longer to make its public entry into that country's legal,
political and cultural landscape.
A number of reasons explain why the Salinas administration officially
recognized the importance of human rights in Mexico. Both domestic, as
well as external, factors contributed to this recognition." s Domestically,
this recognition came as a result of the "crisis of legitimacy" that his
government confronted since its inauguration on December 1, 1988.11

361. See generally the organizations and reports mentioned in supra note 260, in particular
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH.

362. Alejandro Sobarzo, Nafta and Human Rights in Mexico, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 607-24
(Summer 1994). See this article for a pro-government review of the situation of human rights
in Mexico. Dr. Sobarzo, a former Director of the PRI's Office of International Relations,
currently is the Regional Delegate of Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (SRE) in Sonora.
363. Acosta, supra note 179, at vi.
364. See, inter alia, A POLICY OF IMPUNITY, supra note 151, at 9-21; HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT, supra note 359, at 5-6; and Prepared Statement of Amnesty International, U.S.A., in
Current Developments, supra note 177, at 35-68.
365. See ACOSTA, supra note 179, at vi.
366. Larry Rochter, Can He Save Mexico?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988, § 6, at 34. It has
been alleged that President Salinas, competing for the PRI, in fact lost the presidential election
in 1988 and that the winner was Cuauhtdmoc C rdenas, the PRD candidate. The official final
count gave 51% of the votes to the PRI and 49 % to the PRD.The PRI publicly accepted that
it had lost the election in Mexico City, that favored the PRD.
Salinas now finds himself with his own credibility in question. He won the July 6
election with an unprecedently low 50.7 percent of the vote, and that only after long
delays in counting ballots--delays the opposition cited as proof of massive vote fraud.
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Externally, the Salinas administration was virtually compelled to develop
a "positive international image" for Mexico, indispensable to guarantee
success in concluding NAFTA with the United States and Canada.3 67 For
example, the creation of the National Commission of Human Rights in
Mexico City, in June of 1990, took place around the time when serious
human rights violations of international consequences had been alleged, 3"
as well as the presentation of America's Watch book Human Rights in
Mexico: A Policy of Impunity.
The official U.S. policy with respect to human rights in Mexico has been
deliberately timid and discreet. This policy centers upon a relationship of
respect and non-U.S. intervention in Mexico's internal affairs, especially now
that closeness, cooperation and cordiality tend to predominate in these
bilateral interactions. If U.S. policy is hardened it is likely to have adverse
effects on United States-Mexico relations and be counterproductive.
It is only logical, then, that the United States should adhere to a policy
that fully respects the will of the Mexican people regarding human rights in
their country. Now that the government of Mexico, and especially the Mexicans, are interested in the protection and dissemination of human rights, the
U.S. should provide whatever encouragement and support are needed for this
trend to continue.
At the non-official level, both individuals and institutions in this country,
in particular NGOs and academicians, should be ready and willing to provide
any needed information, assistance and cooperation to their counterparts in
Mexico to enhance and strengthen the human rights cause.
In early June, the National Commission of Human Rights produced a
report on the allegations of human rights violations committed as a result of
the Chiapas conflict. In its recommendations, the CNDH expressly recognized that members of the Mexican Army, as well as public servants of the
Attorney General's Office "physically mistreated" at least fifteen persons in
Ocosingo, Chiapas, "denying them food and water," and charging them
falsely.369 On the question of massive expulsion of indigenous peoples, the
Cardenas, who was officially awarded 31.1 percent of the vote but claims he and his
populist National Democratic Front were the true victors, charges that the election
proves that the P.R.I. is hopelessly corrupt and incapable of reforming itself, and that
Salinas has become the prisoner of the very forces he says he wants to supplant.
In its "Document of Demands for a Dignified Peace in Chiapas," dated March 1, 1994,
the EZLN demanded the resignation of the Federal and State governments, claiming that they
reached power through electoral fraud. Demand 2, app. 2; 254 BOLETIN DE INFORMACION
SEMANAL DE LA SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES ExTERIoREs, March 5, 1994, at 49 (translation
and emphasis by the author).

367. See ACOSTA, supra note 179, at vi.
368. Acosta suggests that the CNDH's creation anteceded, by a few days, the killing of the

human rights advocate Norma Corona and the death threats made against Jorge Castafieda. Id.
369. See CNDH Recomendaci6n 53/94, dated April 14, 1994, at 2, 3, addressed to the

Attorney General of Mexico. The CNDH recommends that the criminal charges filed before the
First District Court in the State of Chiapas (Causa Penal 6/94) be dismissed for lack of merit.
It should be noted that the CNDH did not formulate any charges, nor did it request the conduct
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CNDH states:
The problem of expulsions has not been resolved after almost twenty years
[have passed] since the first massive expulsion of Indians in San Juan
Chamula in 1974 was recorded, and after almost four years since the
CNDH received the first complaint . ..it is estimated that more than
15,000 Indians (although some estimates surpass 25,000) have been
expelled from their locales and municipalities over the last 20 years, most
of them in the municipality of San Juan Chamula [Chiapas].... Expulsions are generally backed with physical and moral violence, jailing of
men, women and children, raping of women, battery in front of the
community (including the total undressing of women), plunder, destruction
and burning of houses, [and] humiliations, among other mistreatments.
The complainant pointed out to the municipal authorities as responsible for
these violations, specifically the mayor of the village [Presidente municipal], the judge and the members of the city council [Regidores]. °
CONCLUSION
The range of contrasting interpretations of the Chiapas rebellion, most
filled with emotional intensity, may be characterized as one of the most
fascinating reflections of Mexico's modem schizophrenic personality. Some
Mexicans were in favor of a military wipe-out, leading to the "complete
annihilation" of the rebel forces, while few others favored a more rational
approach. Whether on the side of emotion or rationality, the conflict of
Chiapas placed on the negotiating table of Mexico's public opinion-for the
first time in Mexican history-of the contrasting differences between
indigenous peoples and mestizos, or probably more directly, the gulf between
poor and wealthy Mexicans.
Philosophically, the rebellion in Chiapas touched upon one of the most
hidden secrets that has been living in Mexico since times immemorial times:
a pervasive racial discrimination directed against its own indigenous peoples.
There is no doubt the fifty-six ethnic groups that have managed to survive in
Mexico have suffered a constant but silent discrimination in cultural, legal,
political, and economic sense. Today, it is becoming evident that the origin
of this discrimination may be traced to racial considerations. The recent
amendment to Article 4 of Mexico's 1917 Constitution, recognizing that
of any investigation, against the members of the Mexican Army and the public servants of the
Attorney General's Office for the "physicalmistreatment" inflicted on the campesinos (translation
and emphasis by the author).
370. See CNDH Recomendaci6n 58/94, April 14, 1994, at 5-7. Recommendation regarding
the Case of Expulsions in Different Places of the Municipality of San Juan Chamula, Chiapas,
addressed to the Governor of the State, the President of the State Legislature and the Mayor.
These expulsions were conducted by municipal authorities and caciques because of religious
persecution: the expelled persons were not of the Catholic religion but Evangelists. The CNDH
states that neither an investigation, nor criminal charges were ever formulated against those
presumed responsible, thus causing "a climate of impunity in the region or, worse, . . . a tacit
invitation to the commission of illicit conducts, denying the imparting of justice to the most
unprotected sector of our society: the Indians," Id. at 45. (Translation and emphasis by the
author).
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country's "pluriethnic composition" constitutes a small step in the right
direction. However, despite the fact that this constitutional change was made
three years ago, the corresponding federal statute needed to implement it at
the domestic legal and judicial levels has not yet been enacted.
The Chiapas rebellion brought to the national attention of Mexico, albeit
temporarily, the delicate and controversial question of whether the indigenous
peoples have a right to their autonomy. In a recent essay on this question, the
eminent philosopher Luis Villoro wrote:
Since the 16th century, for creoles and mestizos, indigenous peoples
have been outcasts; outcasts, judged and manipulated for their exploitation
or ...for their redemption. It is we, the Non-Indians, who decide for
them. It is we who utilize them, but also who imagine we are saving them.
The marginality of the indigenous peoples is the work of the Non-Indians,
but also the result of that indigenous-oriented policy that would help them
be liberated .... The true liberation of the Indian is to recognize him as
a subject, whose fate is in his own hands; a subject capable of judging us
according to his own values, as we have always judged him; a subject
capable of exercising his liberty without restraints, as we demand to
exercise it. To be a complete subject is to be autonomous. The so-called
"Indian problem" has one solution only: the recognition of the autonomy
of the indigenous peoples. 37'

The slow but gradual recognition of the "pluriethnic composition" of
Mexico, likely to be accelerated by the enactment of the domestic legislation
to implement the change in Article 4 of its Constitution, as well as by the
constant progress being made in human rights, is expected to bring about a
stronger delineation of a new type of Mexican law generated in response to
those specific cultural values and distinct interests characteristic of indigenous
peoples. This special kind of a law, probably a hybrid combining customary
and positive law with indigenous and mestizo legal notions, may be known
as "Mexican Ethnic Law."
From the human rights perspective, the Chiapas rebellion left a tragic
trail of violations. These violations were committed by members of the
EZLN and by elements of the Mexican Army, and by public officials at the
federal, state and local levels. Virtually nothing has been said about
violations committed by members of the EZLN, especially since President

Salinas enacted in early 1994 a federal statute granting a general amnesty to
those civilians involved in the conflict.
However, the situation is quite different regarding the crimes and human
rights violations committed by elements of the Mexican Army, and certain

public officials. These crimes and violations consist of (1) direct bombing of
civilian towns and villages; (2) illegal detention of persons; (3) arbitrary
searches and seizures of private homes; (4) abuses of authority; (5) intimidation and threats; (6) torture; (7) disappearance of persons; (8) homicide of

371. Luis Villoro, Los Pueblos Indios y el Derecho a la Autonomla, NEXOS No. 197, May
1994 at 41-47 (translation by the author).
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civilians; and (9) summary executions. Numerous human rights organizations
within and outside Mexico are following very closely any developments
associated with the handling of these crimes and violations. The reason is
simple: the final outcome in these cases will offer a clear indication of
whether the government of Mexico is legitimately committed to the
protection of human rights.
The manner in which the CNDH conducted some of its investigations,
in particular those involving the Mexican Army, the National Secretariat of
the Defense (Sedena) and the Attorney General's Office (PGR), raise some
questions about the Commission's independence and impartiality. It should
be pointed out that this is not the first time that the CNDH's impartiality has
been questioned.
However, considering the decisive role the CNDH plays in sustaining
and advancing the cause of human rights within and outside Mexico. In
particular in Latin America, special efforts must be made to administratively
restructure the National Commission, so its impartiality and political
Securing the CNDH's impartiality and
independence are guaranteed.
independence, probably by shielding its functions from the Executive
(including the appointment of its director), may be necessary to endow the
CNDH with the power and respect required to better promote the cause of
human rights in Mexico.
A growing number of NGOs from the United States such as Amnesty
International, the Human Rights Watch/Americas, the Center for Human
Rights and Constitutional Law, and the Minnesota Lawyers Association, to
mention a few, should continue to actively participate in the shaping and
sharing of human rights in Mexico. 3" More importantly, it is expected
that these and other entities will endeavor to provide their sustained advice
and guidance for the benefit and proliferation of similar organizations in
Mexico, particularly those interested in the dissemination, promotion and
strengthening of this noble cause.
In his last State of the Union Report, on November 1, 1994, President
Salinas recognized that:
The conflict has not been resolved, it has been contained. The cease-fire
is still on, the violence has been halted and the intention to internationalize
the conflict was dashed. The Chiapas electoral process was held throughout
the State, and advancements have been made in the resolution of the basic
problems. I issue here, before the Nation, a new call for a dialogue to
negotiate terms to convert the conflict into a program of solutions based on
respect, civility and progress. This is what the Mexicans want. Until the
end of my mandate, I shall continue to promote a dignified peace for that

372. See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Non-Governmental
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AJIL 611 (1994).
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region in Chiapas. 3"
How is the Chiapas conflict going to be resolved? Political pundits
suggest that the new President of Mexico, Dr. Zedillo, is to appoint a new
Commissioner for Peace and Reconciliation. Much depends upon the
professional and political qualifications of the new Commissioner. Furthermore, it appears that the "solution" to the Chiapas conflict will consist of a
continued outpouring of federal funds to the State of Chiapas under
the
374
Solidarity Program, expected to be continued by President Zedillo.
The conflict of Chiapas is far from being resolved. No quick solution
will remedy a complex and delicate problem that decades, if not centuries,
of apathy and neglect gradually created. The risk of not finding a prompt and
fair solution to the predicament in Chiapas opens the frightening possibility
that this type of conflict will spread to other economically depressed areas in
Mexico that have been culturally ignored and politically abandoned.
More than a socio-political phenomenon, Chiapas must be considered as
a lesson. A lesson to all Mexicans, but especially to the political rulers and
to the economically affluent. A lesson that speaks of justice and democracy,
values ethnic and cultural diversity and, above all, promotes human rights
and advances the cause for a better distribution of wealth on a national scale
within the Mexican society.
Respect for indigenous peoples must embrace their culture, language,
religion, usages and traditions, including their own customary law and their
own system for imparting justice. The right that indigenous peoples have to
possess their own political structures within their own communities, as well
as the right to be politically represented in the local, state and federal organs,
is probably the most important avenue that indigenous peoples have to secure
their own existence and future survival.
The Chiapas uprising vividly brought to the attention of Mexicans the
dissenting voice of an ethnic minority who challenged NAFTA's notion as
an economic panacea. At the same time, the rebellion cast serious doubts on
Mexico's image as a nation that had made substantial progress in becoming
economically sound, politically stable, and well-prepared to receive a needed
flow of permanent foreign investment.
Domestically, NAFTA is producing profound changes in Mexico to its
economy, culture, legal system, and democratic process. Above all, NAFTA
has been a powerful instrument to develop the notion of human rights in
Mexico. For Mexicans, the prospects of a more fair and stable economic
373. SEXTO INFORME PRESIDENCIAL (Sixth State of the Union Report), delivered before the
Federal Congress, San Lfizaro Palace. Mexico City, November 1, 1994 (Mimeo version at 4)
(translation by the author).
374. In his last State of the Nation Report, President Salinas indicated that: "Paradoxically,
Chiapas is the State that has received the most federal support during my administration: 1,000
per cent more than in 1989. The aid has been used for health, education, electrification, drinking
water, support for production and, for the indigenous peoples, new programs for financing land
purchases, roads and highways." See SEXTO INFORME PRESIDENCIAL supra note 373, at 2.
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order have contributed to the emergence of ideas in favor of democracy,
economic equality, a clean environment, better education, an efficient and
honest government, and national progress. In particular, Mexicans are aware
now of the importance of ethnic diversity within their own country, a concept
that simply did not exist a few years ago. At the international level, Mexico
has initiated a new and closer relation with the United States. With respect
to Canada, Mexico has discovered a new economic partner and a closer
friend.
NAFTA will become a success only when democracy and freedom
prevail, when there is a clear commitment for a more just distribution of
wealth, a clean environment and a growing respect for human rights and
individual dignity.
EPILOGUE

Since the EZLN made public its "Demands and Engagements" on March
2, 1994, a series of shocking events have jolted Mexico. These include
political assassinations,375 a presidential election,376 and the latest devaluation of the peso, 3" immediately followed by the current economic crisis.37 Although the gravity of these happenings has somewhat eclipsed the
image of that turbulent Chiapas of a year ago, the EZLN has not gone away.
It is present, strategically well-poised, and waiting.
During the dying days of the Salinas regime, the peace negotiations
became unproductive and stale. The fact that Lic. Madrazo never held any
personal conversations with Subcommandante Marcos clearly suggested that
these consultations were destined to fail.37 9 A legitimate forum for a frank
dialogue, was never properly crafted. Therefore, the ascension to power of
President Zedillo offers the best opportunity for finding a peaceful solution
to the Chiapas predicament. A new presidential administration with new
people, and especially with new ideas, must find the right approach to this
complex and delicate problem.
As this epilogue is being written (January 17, 1995), Mexico's Secretary
of the Interior, Lic. Esteban Moctezuma, is conducting peace talks with
Subcommandante Marcos at an undisclosed location in the remote Lacand6n

375. Jo Bedingfield, Walking a Tightrope, Economic Shortfalls and Political Jolts
Complicate Mexico's 1994 Recovery, EL FINANCIERO, (Int. ed.), Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 1,
1995, at 8.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Martin Langfield, Chiapas Peace Envoy Steps Down, Urges Overhaul, REUTERS,
LTD., Nov. 28, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library, World File.
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jungle, assisted by Bishop Samuel Ruiz as mediator. 3" Hopefully, these
conversations will eventually result in a just and prompt solution to the
legitimate demands advanced by the indigenous peoples of Chiapas. Dr.
Zedillo has strongly expressed his belief that this conflict is only to be
resolved by peaceful means, based on an open and constructive dialogue.3"'
There is no doubt that the road will be a long one, seeded with challenges.
But there is hope. The first step in the right direction has been taken.

380. Government and EZLN holdfirst direct talks "somewhere in the jungle", BBC

SUMMARY OF WORLD REPORTS, January 18, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,

World File.
381. Mexican government, rebels meet in search of peace, REUTERS WORLD
January 16, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, World File.
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APPENDIX 1
CNDH's PERMANENT PROGRAM IN THE HIGHLANDS AND
JUNGLES OF CHIAPAS

(JANUARY 1, TO MAY 31, 1994)

1.

274 alleged violations to human rights affecting 889 persons.

II. Partial breakdown of complaints
Number of
complaints

TPe

461
76
64
57
54
42
37
17
13
10
10
5
2
2
2
23

Disappearances
Torture
Homicides
Arbitrary detentions
Injuries
Abuse of authority
Threats and intimidation
False accusations
Theft
Illegal deprivation of freedom
Damage to property
Limitations to transit
Confiscation of assets
Kidnappings
Illegal entries to3 homes
Other violations 2

Number of
complaints

Violator

89
31
4
3
12
1
1

Mexican Army
EZLN
Attorney General's Office (PGR)
Chiapas' government officials and judicial agent
Mayors of Chiapas town: (1) San Crist6bal de las Cases;
(2) Altamirano; (3) Las Margaritas; (4) Oxchuc; (5) San
Juan Chamula; (6) Sitald, and (7) Tenejapa
Former governor of the State of Chiapas
President of the State's Superior Tribunal of Justice

382. INFORME ANUAL, supra note 188, at 621-24.
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16

69

Municipal Police of San Crist6bal de las Cases
Federal Police of Highways and Ports
Authority involved not yet determined 38
ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT CASES

1. Five persons "executed" in Ocosingo's municipal market (No date)
A.
After evaluation of existing evidence, the CNDH reached the
conclusion that, "with a high degree of probability, the five subjects
. . were killed in maneuvers of summary execution.3 4
B.
Preliminary conclusion of the PGR: "The killings were the product
of maneuvers of summary
execution" but no members of the Mexican
3
Army are implicated. 1
2. Serial attacks in San Crist6bal de las Casas, Ocosingo, and Nuevo San
Carlos. (no date)
A.
Evidence found in San Antonio de Los Bafios (a part of San
Crist6bal): "craters produced by aerial attacks".
B.

Evidence found in Ocasingo: "aerial artillery impacts or mortar

fire".
C.
Evidence found in Nuevo San Carlos: "an aerial attack operation
was documented."
The CNDH has technically determined that the projectiles used
"correspond to those known as 'rockets' or missiles, whose destructive
capacity, due to their expansive ware and expulsion of fragments (shrapnel),
is less than bombs.""
3. Incident in Rancho Nuevo involving a van used for public transportation
(Jan. 4, 1994).
A.
Soldiers of Mexican Army shot at van killing four male adults and
one minor and injuring five people.
B.

383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The CNDH concludes that "it is proven that the final position of

at 622-623.
at 635 (translation by the author).
(translation by the author).
at 636 (translation by the author).
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the passenger [who was shot] was not the ultimate or final.. ." implying
that the passenger in question had been shot while out of the van and
then his body was placed back in the front passenger seat.3 9'
4.

Eleven bodies found in Ocasingo's municipal cemetery (Jan. 3-4, 1994).
A.
The CNDH reports that soldiers of the "Mexican Army bursted
into the IMSS Hospital" in Ocasingo "with no apparent valid reason
since the clinic was not under the EZLN's control, nor were any of the
EZLN's members were hospitalized."
B.
Patients, their families, nurses, workers and medical doctors were
detained for hours in the clinic's back patio by soldiers of the Mexican
Army, who interrogated them constantly. After sleeping in the hospital,
this group (consisting of some 150 people) were "evacuated" by the
Mexican Army and the hospital closed."
C.
The CNDH recognizes that out of the 11 bodies found, eight
persons were killed at the hospital (presumably by members of the
Mexican Army) on January 4, 1994, and their bodies removed "without
knowing the cause of their deaths." 389
D.
Out of eleven persons killed, the CNDH reports that two were
civilians who died outside the clinic, five were relatives of patients, and
two were patients (these two were killed by gunshots in the thorax).
These nine bodies have been identified, the other two remained unidenti-

fied.Y
E.

The PGR and the Attorney General for Military Justice have

initiated the corresponding inquiry.39'
5. Two bodies found in Las Margaritas (Jan. 16 & 24, 1994).
A.
These two persons were originally detained on Jan. 16, 1994 by
the municipal police in Las Margaritas, and then put in jail. They were
taken out of jail by "elements of the Mexican Army" and transported to
El Progreso on January 24, 1994, their dead bodies were found in Agua
Prieta.3

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id. at 635-37 (translation by the author).
Id. at 637.
Id. (translation by the author).
Id. at 638.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639 (translation by the author).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss1/2

70

Vargas: NAFTA,
the CHIAPAS
Chiapas Rebellion,
and the
Mexican LAW
Ethnic 71
ANDEmergence
MEXICANofETHNIC
REBELLION,
1994]
NAFTA,

6.

Attacks against journalists (Jan. 7, 1994).
A.
Three Mexican journalists alleged their human rights were violated
on January 7, 1994, when they were attacked by gunshots from a
Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (Sedenal) helicopter near San
Crist6bal de las Cases, Cerro Tzontzehuit. 3
B.
Sedenal informed that on January 7, a military confrontation had
taken place at Cerro de Tzontzehuit with EZLN forces, but "at no time
were any journalists attacked. "'
A similar gunfire attack was reported by the CNDH involving a
C.
Mexican Army helicopter and four journalists when they were travelling
from Las Margarita to Guadalupe. 3

7. Finding of three human skeletal remains in the Ejido Morelia, Altamirano (Jan. 7-20, 1994).
A.
During a military operation conducted by the Mexican Army on
January 7, 1994 in the Ejido Morelia, the Municipality of Altamirano,
three persons disappeared."
B.
The skeletal remains of three persons were found on February 11,
3
1994. Physiciansfor Human Rights is involved in this investigation. 9
8. Shooting and killing of a person by elements of the Mexican Army near
Rancho Nuevo (Jan. 3, 1994).
A.
The CNDH reports that on January 3, 1994 a group of persons
were riding a truck "when they were attacked by elements of 83rd
Battalion of the Secretariat of National Defense ... near Rancho Nuevo,
Municipality of San Crist6bal de las Casas. As a consequence of this
attack one person died and another one was arrested [by the Mexican
Army]. 398
After investigating this case, the CNDH concluded that (a) the
B.
vehicle in question did not transport a group of armed persons (contrary
to information released by Sedenal); (b) that the person in question was

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Id.
Id. at 641 (translation by the author).
Id. at 641.
Id.
Id.at 642.

398. Id. (translation by the author).
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shot while he was outside the vehicle; and, (c) that the murderer shot the
victim9 at a very close range (at a distance of no more than twelve inch39

es).

9. The summary execution of fourteen people traveling in a van as a result
of "military confrontation" (Jan. 2, 1994).
A.
The CNDH reports that on January 2, 1994 an armed confrontation between elements of the Mexican Army and a group of people
riding in a small bus took place near Rancho Nuevo, Municipality of San
Crist6bal de las Casas. As a result of this confrontation fourteen
civilians died. Allegedly, each of the fourteen victims received a coup
de grace (i.e. a shot in the head).
B.
There are two unconfirmed versions: One suggests that this was
group of civilians in their way to Rancho Nuevo to pick up a coffin of
a person who had died in Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas. The second
suggests that the members of the group were EZLN members on their
way to free the inmates in the Centro de Readaptaci6n Social No. 5.
Neither version is conclusive. 4"
10. Illegal detention of twenty-one persons in Centro de readaptaci6n Social
No. 1 in Tuxtla Gutierrez. (No date).
A.
According to the CNDH, probable human rights violations were
committed against twenty-one persons under penal proceedings in Tuxtla
Gutierrez. This group of people physically mistreated by "elements of
the Mexican Army and public officials of the Attorney General's Office
(PGR)" whom, without an adequate legal cause "illegally deprived these
persons of their freedom."'"w
The CNDH sent a letter to the Attorney General of Mexico (PGR,
B.
Recommendation 53.94) requesting that the criminal charges against the
21 persons be dismissed since "the elements supporting [the charges] had
On April 18, 1994, the PGR agreed to this and the
disappeared."'
penal judge in the case "decreed the freedom of the accused."
However, the CNDH clarified that "regarding the confusing
C.
circumstances of their arrest, their prolonged detention (sic), the
evidence of violence shown by these persons and "that neither food nor

399.
400.
401.
402.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

653.
643-44.
644 (translation by the author).
645 (translation by the author).
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water was given to them" during their illegal deprivation of freedom.
The CNDH added an exculpatory statement that given that there were
intense military combats in Ocasingo, and that the Ministerio Publico
was absent at that time, "this made very difficult, the immediate transfer
of the detainers" given the unusual conditions at that time.'
11. Violent Expulsions of Indigenous People in San Juan Chamula (No date)
A. The CNDH issued Recommendation 58/94 of April 19, 1994
stating that "the expulsions violated the constitutional right of religious
freedom and indigenous customs in violation of human rights at the
domestic and international levels."'
B. In its Recommendation, the CNDH requested the President of the
local State Congress to initiate the corresponding investigations, and
added the Mayor of San Juan Chamula "to abstain from the continued
injuring of assets and rights of the indigenous peoples in that town, and
to respect the religious creeds and to guarantee the peaceful relations
among [its inhabitants], impeding or not promoting new expulsions. "'

C. The CNDH received 263 complaints of indigenous peoples affected
by these violent expulsions. A number who died were injured or
disappeared according to the CNDH.1

403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 646 (translation by the author).
Id. at 646 (translation by the author).
Id. at 646-47 (translation by the author).
Id. at 647.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994

73

74

California Western
International
Law Journal,
Vol.JOURNAL
25, No. 1 [1994],[Vol.
Art. 225
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW

APPENDIX 2
DEMANDS AND COMPROMISES FOR A DIGNIFIED PEACE IN CHIAPAS SAN
CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MARCH 2, 1994

ONE: We require that a truly free and democratic election should be held,
with equality of rights and duties for the political organizations that seek
power, with authentic freedom to choose one or the other proposition with
respect for the will of the majority. Democracy is a fundamental right of all
the people, indigenous or not. Without democracy, there can be no liberty,
justice, or dignity, and without dignity, there is nothing.
TWO: In order to have truly free and democratic elections, it is necessary
that the heads of the Federal and State governments that came to power
through electoral fraud renounce their positions. Their legitimacy does not
derive from the respect for the will of the majority but rather from its
usurpation. Consequently, it is necessary that a government of transition be
formed in order to implement equality and respect all political tendencies.
The federal and state legislative powers, freely and democratically elected,
should assume their true function of drafting fair laws for all and to supervise
their enforcement.
THREE: We demand the recognition of the National Liberation Zapatista
Army (EZLN) as a belligerent force and its troops as genuine combatants as
well as the application of all the international treaties that regulate armed
conflicts.
FOUR: A new pact among the components of the federation that will
terminate centralism and allow regions, communities and municipal
communities to be self-governing with political, economic and cultural
autonomy.
FIVE: We demand to have general elections for the entire state of Chiapas
with legal recognition of all the political forces in the state.
SIX: As a producer of electricity and oil, the state of Chiapas contributes to
the federation without receiving anything in exchange. Our communities do
not have electricity; the economy stimulated by the oil exports and the
domestic sales have produced no benefits to the people of Chiapas.
Therefore, it is essential that all the communities of Chiapas receive the
benefit of the electric power and that a percentage of the economic income
from the commercialization of the oil from Chiapas be applied to the
industrial, agricultural, commercial and social infrastructure for the benefit
of all the people of Chiapas.
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SEVEN: Revision of the North American Free Trade Agreement signed
with Canada and the United States, since in its actual wording, it does not
take into account the indigenous peoples, sentencing them to death because
of their lack of labor skill.
EIGHT: Article 27 of the Constitution should respect the original spirit of
Emiliano Zapata: the land belongs to those who work it, the indigenous
peoples and the farmers, and not to the large land holders (latifundos). We
want the large land holdings which are in the hands of national or foreign
land holders and other people who occupy large extensions of land who are
not farmers, to pass to the hands of our people who are totally deprived of
lands, such as provided by our revolutionary agrarian law. The land grants
should include agricultural equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, credits,
technical advice, improved seeds, and cattle. Fair prices should be given to
basic products such as coffee, corn and beans. The land to be distributed
must be of good quality and should include roads, transportation and
irrigation systems. The peasants who already possess lands have the right to
all the above mentioned benefits in order to facilitate the work in the
agricultural fields and to improve productivity. New ejidos and communities
should also be established. The Salinas amendments to Article 27 of the
Constitution should be annulled and the right to land should once again be
a part of our Constitution.
NINE: We demand that hospitals be built in the county towns; these
hospitals should include specialized medical practitioners and be provided
with sufficient medicine to take care of the patients. County clinics should
be built in the municipalities, communities, and hamlets, with efficient
training and fair income for health care personnel. Where hospitals already
exist, they should be put into service as fast as possible and should include
complete surgery services-Clinics should also be built in large communities
which should also have doctors and medicine to take care of the people's
needs.

TEN: The right to true and accurate information on events at a local,
regional, state, national and international level should be guaranteed to the
indigenous people through the establishment of an indigenous radio station
to be independent from the government and directed and managed by the
indigenous peoples.
ELEVEN: We want houses to be built in all the rural communities of Mexico
which should include basic services such as: electricity, drinking water,
roads, sewers, telephone, transportation, etc. And they should also have the
advantages that the cities have, such as television, gas range, refrigerator,
washing machine, etc. The communities should have recreation centers, for
the healthy leisure of their inhabitants: sports and cultural events that dignify
the human condition of the indigenous peoples.
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TWELVE: We want the eradication of illiteracy among indigenous people.
To achieve that, we need better elementary and secondary schools in our
communities which include free pedagogical material, teachers with
university degrees to be at the service of the indigenous community, and not
only defend the interests of the wealthy people. There should be primary,
secondary, and high schools in major towns. The government should give
free school uniforms, shoes, food and all the necessary materials to students.
In the central communities which are located in remote places, there should
be boarding schools. Education should be totally free, kindergarten to
university and should be granted to all Mexicans without regard to race,
creed, age, sex or political affiliation.
THIRTEEN: That all ethnic languages should be made official, and that their
study and teaching be mandatory at primary, secondary, high school, and
university levels.
FOURTEEN: That our rights and dignity as indigenous peoples be respected,
taking into consideration our culture and traditions.
FIFTEEN: We, the indigenous peoples, do not want to continue being
subjected to discrimination and contempt, as has always been the case.
SIXTEEN: As the indigenous peoples that we are, we demand that we be
allowed to organize and govern ourselves with autonomy, because we no
longer want to be subjected to the will of those with power, whether they are
nationals or foreigners.
SEVENTEEN: That justice be administered by our own indigenous peoples
according to our customs and traditions, without the intervention of
illegitimate and corrupt governments.
EIGHTEEN: We want always to have decent work with a fair salary for all
rural and city workers in the Mexican republic so that our brothers will not
have to be involved in bad things, such as drug trafficking, delinquency and
prostitution, in order to survive. That the Federal Labor Act be applied to
rural and city workers, with "Aguinaldos" (i.e. Christmas bonus), benefits,
vacation and a true right to strike.
NINETEEN: We want a fair price for our agricultural produce; for this we
need to have a free market to sell and buy, without being subject to coyotes.
TWENTY: That the looting of the riches of our Mexico be halted and, above
all, that of Chiapas, which is one of the richest states of the republic but
where hunger and misery abound every day.
TWENTY-ONE: We want the cancellation of all loans resulting from credits,
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss1/2
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loans and taxes-with high interest because they can no longer be paid due to
the great poverty of the Mexican people.
TWENTY-TWO: We want hunger and malnutrition to be halted because they
have only caused the death of thousands of our brothers from rural and urban
areas. In each rural community, there should be cooperative stores with fair
prices, supported economically by the Federal or municipal governments.
In addition, there should be transportation owned by the cooperatives, for the
transportation of merchandise. Furthermore, the government should send free
food to all children under 14 years of age.
TWENTY-THREE: We request the immediate and unconditional release of
all political prisoners and of poor prisoners unjustly detained in all the
prisons of Chiapas and Mexico.
TWENTY-FOUR: We demand that the Federal army and the public security
and judicial police not enter rural zones, because their only aim is to
intimidate, expel, rob, repress and to drop bombs on the farmers who
organize themselves to protect their rights. For this reason our people are
weary of the presence of the soldiers and the public security and judicial
police, who are abusive and repressive. That the Federal government return
to the Swiss government the Pilatus planes which are only being used to
bomb our people, and that the money obtained in exchange for their return
be applied to programs to improve the living of rural and city workers. We
demand that the government of the United States of North America withdraw
its helicopters because they are being used to repress the people of Mexico.
TWENTY-FIVE: The indigenous peoples in rural areas started the armed
uprising because they had no more than their humble shacks; however when
the Federal Army drops bombs on the civilian population it destroys these
humble shacks and all of the belongings. For this reason, we demand that the
Federal government indemnify the families who have suffered material
damages caused by the bombing and by the actions of the Federal troops.
Furthermore, we want indemnification for the widows and the war orphans,
whether civilians or Zapatistas.
TWENTY-SIX: We, as indigenous peasants, want to live in peace and
tranquility. And we want to be allowed to live according to our rights to
freedom and to a dignified life.
TWENTY-SEVEN: That the Criminal Code of Chiapas be done away with
since it does not allow us organize ourselves except with arms, because any
legal and peaceful struggle is punished and repressed.
TWENTY-EIGHT: We request and demand the cease of the expulsion of the
indigenous peoples from their communities by caciques who are supported
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by the State. We demand the free and voluntary return of the land of their
origin and that indemnification for the losses they have incurred be
guaranteed.
TWENTY-NINE: Petition of the indigenous women. We the peasant
indigenous women demand the immediate solution of our urgent needs,
which the government has never solved:
a) Maternity wards with gynecologists, so that the peasant women may
receive necessary medical attention.
b) That child care centers be built in communities.
c) We demand that the government send sufficient food stuffs for the children
of all the rural communities, such as: milk, maize, rice, corn, soy, oil,
beans, cheese, eggs, sugar, soup, oats, etc.
d) That kitchen and dining rooms for children be constructed in the
communities and be provided with all necessary services.
e) That mills for nixtamal and tortillerias be set up in the communities
depending on the number of families who live there.
f) We want these projects to be given to us: construction of barns for hens,
rabbits, lambs, sheep, pigs, etc. which include technical assistance and
veterinary services.
g) We want a bakery with ovens and all necessary materials.
h) We want handicraft workshops with machinery and raw materials to be
constructed.
i) There should be a market where handicrafts may be sold at fair prices.
j) That schools be constructed where women can receive technical training.
k) That preschool centers and elementary school be provided to rural
communities where children may enjoy themselves and grow up in a healthy
way, morally and physically.
1) That we, as women, have adequate transport to get around and to transport
our products from our different rural projects.
THIRTY: We demand the political trial of Mess Patrocinio Gonzales, Blanco
Garrido, Absalon Castellanos Dominguez and Elmar Setzer M.
THIRTY-ONE: We demand respect for the lives of all the members of the
EZLN and to receive guarantees that no criminal proceedings or repressive
action may be directed against any of the members of the EZLN, combatants, sympathizers, or collaborators.
THIRTY-TWO: That all of the organizations and commissions in defense of
human rights be independent, namely non-governmental, because those
connected with the government only hide the arbitrariness of the government.
THIRTY-THREE: That a National Peace Commission for Justice and Dignity
be formed mainly by people who do not belong to the Mexican government
nor to any political party. And that this National Peace Commission for
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol25/iss1/2

78

Vargas: NAFTA,
theCHIAPAS
Chiapas Rebellion,
and the
MexicanLAW
Ethnic 79
MEXICANofETHNIC
ANDEmergence
REBELLION,
NAFTA,
1994]

Justice and Dignity be in charge of supervising the compliance with the
agreements to be reached between the EZLN and the Mexican Federal
government.
THIRTY-FOUR: That humanitarian help for the victims of the conflict be
channeled through genuine representatives of the indigenous communities.
Liberty! Justice! Democracy!
Respectfully,
From the Mexican Southeast
Indigenous Revolutionary Clandestine Committee,
General Commanding Post of the EZLN,
Mexico, March 19941

407. Secretariade Relationes Exteriores, 254
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